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Note
No Longer Available: Critiquing the
Contradictory Ways Courts Treat Exclusive
Arbitration Forum Clauses when the Forum Can
No Longer Arbitrate
Nicole Wanlass*
Joyce Green, a senior citizen living on social security, entered into a loan in 2012 with two companies collectively known
1
as “the Loan Machine.” With a 36% annual percentage rate
(APR), the loan terms Joyce Green agreed to were not exactly
2
favorable. However, after the Loan Machine compounded the
loan with various fees, the actual interest rate was around
3
200% APR. Thus, even after paying back $983.93 over three
months, Green still owed $1,533.67 on her original $1,650
4
loan. Furthermore, Green only discovered this deception
months later when she requested billing statements from the
5
Loan Machine.
The loan agreement contained an arbitration clause which
stated that all disputes would “be resolved by binding arbitration by one arbitrator by and under the Code of Procedure of
6
the National Arbitration Forum.” However, the National Arbitration Forum (NAF) has not been accepting consumer arbitra-

* J.D. Candidate 2016, University of Minnesota Law School; M.S. Biomedical Engineering Candidate 2015, University of Minnesota; B.S. 2012,
Texas A&M University. I’d like to thank my family for always being so supportive of me, particularly throughout my law school journey. I’d also like to
thank the editors and staff of the Minnesota Law Review who worked so hard
to bring this Note to print. Copyright © 2015 by Nicole Wanlass.
1. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 2–3, Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill.,
LLC, 724 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 2013) (No. 13-1262), 2013 WL 1886964; Paul
Bland, Activist Seventh Circuit Panel Helps Out Payday Lender Re-Writing
Arbitration Clause Picking Corrupt Firm, PUB. JUST. (Aug. 2, 2013), http://
publicjustice.net/blog/activist-seventh-circuit-panel-helps-out-payday-lender
-by-re-writing-arbitration-clause.
2. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 1, at 3.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See id.
6. Id. at 4.
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tions since July 2009. Refusing to accept new consumer arbitrations was part of the NAF’s settlement agreement with the
Minnesota Attorney General over its fraudulent and deceptive
8
trade practices. Notwithstanding the NAF’s unavailability,
when Joyce Green brought her dispute to court, the Loan Ma9
chine moved to compel arbitration. The Seventh Circuit upheld
the motion and remanded the case, instructing the district
court to appoint an arbitrator for the parties who would employ
10
the NAF Procedures.
Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Illinois, LLC, illustrates an issue that has plagued state and federal courts alike for years:
What should a court do when the parties’ contract includes an
exclusive arbitration forum agreement and the arbitration fo11
rum cannot, or refuses to, hear the dispute? While this “exclusive arbitration forum dispute” issue may not appear to be substantial, whether a court hears the case or appoints a new
arbitrator can have a huge effect on someone like Joyce Green.
Green’s loan agreement referred any disputes to the NAF,
which had not been accepting arbitrations for nearly three
12
years due to its fraudulent practices against consumers. As
such, it is clear that the Loan Machine was either (a) indolent
in its drafting, or (b) trying to get around the fact that it could
13
no longer employ the pro-creditor NAF as a forum. Beyond the
consumer implications, however, these exclusive arbitration forum disputes are important because they raise issues of contract interpretation (as exclusive arbitration agreements are
contractually created) and statutory interpretation (as courts
have decided these issues under the Federal Arbitration Act),
with courts conflictingly interpreting the same contractual and

7. Id. at 5.
8. See id.; Firm Agrees To End Role in Arbitrating Card Debt, N.Y.
TIMES (July 19, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/20/business/20credit
.html.
9. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 1, at 5.
10. Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 724 F.3d 787, 788, 793 (7th Cir.
2013).
11. See id. at 790–93 (discussing how various courts have approached this
issue); Riley v. Extendicare Health Facilities, Inc., 826 N.W.2d 398, 405–06
(Wis. Ct. App. 2012) (same).
12. See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text.
13. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 1, at 2–5; Firm Agrees To
End Role in Arbitrating Card Debt, supra note 8. The dissenting judge certainly thought this was the situation. Green, 724 F.3d at 794 (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (“When U.S. Cash Advance was still providing for arbitration by the
Forum in 2012, was it being negligent or deliberately deceptive?”).

2015] EXCLUSIVE ARBITRATION FORUM CLAUSES

2007

14

statutory language.
This Note argues that the solution to this issue is two-fold:
practitioners need to more clearly draft these types of clauses,
and the courts must adopt consistent procedures for deciding
exclusive arbitration forum disputes. This two-part solution
will allow parties to better anticipate how a court will interpret
contractual language creating an exclusive arbitration forum
agreement. Part I of this Note discusses the types of situations
that can cause an exclusive arbitration forum to refuse to hear
a dispute, and how courts typically decide whether to adjudicate the dispute or send it to arbitration. It also discusses why
parties may be concerned if the case goes to arbitration rather
than litigation. Part II examines the contradictory and problematic ways in which courts have interpreted the same basic
contractual and statutory language. Part III proposes a twopart solution. First, to ensure that exclusive arbitration disputes never go to court in the first place, this Note contends
that attorneys must take care to draft these agreements unambiguously, and sets out guidelines for doing so. Second, Part III
argues that when courts do hear these disputes, they should
base their rulings on uniformity and fairness. Specifically, this
Note proposes that courts should focus more on the intentions
of the parties, rather than just the plain language of the contract, and appoint a new arbitrator pursuant to their statutorily-granted power only when the parties intended to arbitrate
regardless of whether or not the exclusive arbitration forum
was available.
I. WHY EXCLUSIVE ARBITRATION FORUM DISPUTES
ARISE AND HOW COURTS CURRENTLY HANDLE THEM
This Part discusses the background behind exclusive arbitration forum disputes and the ways in which courts decide
how to rule on them. First, Section A outlines the circumstances under which arbitration forums that parties have exclusively
agreed to have nevertheless declined to hear those parties’ disputes. Section A also discusses the prevalence of these exclusive arbitration forum disputes. Next, Section B discusses the
approaches courts have used to determine whether to adjudicate an exclusive arbitration forum dispute or submit it to arbi14. 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2012); see, e.g., Green, 724 F.3d at 792–93 (holding that 9
U.S.C. § 5 gave the court the authority to appoint a new arbitrator); In re Salomon S’holders’ Derivative Litig., 68 F.3d 554, 559–61 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding
that 9 U.S.C. § 5 did not give the court the authority to appoint a new arbitrator).
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tration. Finally, Section C describes why parties may want
their suit to end up in litigation, rather than arbitration, and
thus why this issue may be an important one to parties that
face it.
A. CIRCUMSTANCES THAT CAUSE, AND THE PREVALENCE OF,
EXCLUSIVE ARBITRATION FORUM DISPUTES
Exclusive arbitration forums refuse or are unable to hear
disputes for a number of reasons. The forum may no longer be
15
in existence by the time the dispute arises. The forum may
have changed its policies since, or even before, the parties
drafted the contract so that the arbitration clause is no longer
16
enforceable in that forum. The forum may have posted a mor17
atorium on the parties’ type of dispute. If the forum limits arbitration to members, the party with the membership may have
lost good standing with the forum since entering into the con18
tract. If the forum has discretion to do so, it may decline to
19
hear the dispute. Or, in rare cases, the forum may have never
15. See, e.g., Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 211 F.3d 1217, 1220–22
(11th Cir. 2000) (noting that the parties agreed to arbitration by the NAF,
which was no longer in existence); Ex parte Warren, 718 So. 2d 45, 46–47 (Ala.
1998) (noting that the parties agreed to arbitration by the National Academy
of Conciliators, which had since gone out of existence).
16. See, e.g., New Port Richey Med. Investors, LLC v. Stern ex rel.
Petscher, 14 So. 3d 1084, 1086 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (discussing how the
parties agreed to arbitration by the American Arbitration Association (AAA)
but that the AAA had changed its policies, even before the parties entered into
the agreement, to only accept cases where the patient entered into the agreement post-dispute); Grant v. Magnolia Manor-Greenwood, Inc., 678 S.E.2d
435, 436–37 (S.C. 2009) (discussing how the parties agreed to arbitration by
the National Health Lawyers Association but that the forum “no longer arbitrate[s] personal injury claims arising under pre-injury arbitration agreements”).
17. See, e.g., QuickClick Loans, LLC v. Russell, 943 N.E.2d 166, 168–70
(Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (stating that the parties agreed to arbitration by either the
NAF or the AAA but that the AAA had since issued a moratorium on certain
debt collection cases); Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Front, 745 S.E.2d 556, 558–
59 (W. Va. 2013) (same).
18. See, e.g., Dover Ltd. v. A.B. Watley, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 7366(FM), 2006
WL 2987054, at *1–3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2006) (noting that the parties agreed
to arbitration by the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), which
will not arbitrate for terminated members without the other party’s consent;
that the NASD terminated the defendant’s membership; and that the plaintiff
did not consent).
19. See, e.g., Salomon, 68 F.3d at 556 (discussing how the parties agreed
to arbitration through the New York Stock Exchange, which has the discretion
to refuse to hear a case and did so with the parties because it found that it had
neither the jurisdiction nor the expertise to hear the dispute); Zechman v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 742 F. Supp. 1359, 1362–63 (N.D.
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conducted arbitrations or never existed in the first place.
Most recently, the primary reason courts face exclusive arbitration forum disputes is because the NAF has stopped ac22
cepting consumer arbitrations. Lori Swanson, the Minnesota
Attorney General, sued the NAF for bias against consumers in
23
July of 2009. The lawsuit included accusations of the NAF “violating state consumer fraud, deceptive trade practices and
false advertising laws by hiding financial ties to collection
24
agencies and credit card companies.” More specifically, among
the charges against the NAF were allegations that the NAF
had ties with the debt-collection law firms representing credit
card companies that arbitrated before it, and that a New York
hedge fund “owned stakes in such collection law firms and the
25
NAF, sending arbitration business between the two.” Three
days after filing the complaint, Swanson and the NAF reached
a settlement in which the NAF agreed to stop accepting all new
26
consumer arbitrations nationwide. Swanson noted that the
“alleged cross ownership” between the NAF and debt collection
law firms helped give her the necessary leverage for the settlement, though she also uncovered allegations that the NAF was
27
even helping creditors write their cases. In simple terms, the
NAF stopped accepting arbitrations because it was defrauding
Ill. 1990) (discussing how the parties agreed to arbitration through the Chicago Board of Trade but that the Board declined to hear the parties’ dispute,
possibly because of a conflict of interest).
20. See Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 768 F.3d 1346, 1348–49 (11th Cir.
2014) (stating that the parties agreed to arbitration conducted by the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Nation but that the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Nation does not conduct arbitrations).
21. See Laboratorios Grossman, S.A. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 295 N.Y.S.2d
756, 757 (App. Div. 1968) (stating that the parties agreed to arbitration by the
Pan-American Arbitration Association, which does not and never has existed).
22. See, e.g., Khan v. Dell Inc., 669 F.3d 350, 351–53 (3d Cir. 2012);
Diversicare Leasing Corp. v. Nowlin, No. 11-CV-1037, 2011 WL 5827208, at *1
(W.D. Ark. Nov. 18, 2011); Klima v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan
Soc’y, No. 10-cv-1390-JAR-JPO, 2011 WL 5412216, at *1 (D. Kan. Nov. 8,
2011); Miller v. GGNSC Atlanta, LLC, 746 S.E.2d 680, 682–84 (Ga. Ct. App.
2013); Carr v. Gateway, Inc., 944 N.E.2d 327, 329–31 (Ill. 2011); Wright v.
GGNSC Holdings LLC, 2011 SD 95, ¶¶ 1–7, 808 N.W.2d 114, 115–17.
23. Minnesota Sues a Credit Arbitrator, Citing Bias, BLOOMBERG BUS.
(July 14, 2009), http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/
jul2009/db20090714_952766.htm.
24. Firm Agrees To End Role in Arbitrating Card Debt, supra note 8.
25. Robert Berner, Big Arbitration Firm Pulls Out of Credit Card Business, BLOOMBERG BUS. (July 19, 2009), http://www.businessweek
.com/investing/wall_street_news_blog/archives/2009/07/big_arbitration.html.
26. See id.
27. Id.
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consumers.
It is difficult to say how often exclusive arbitration forum
disputes arise, as there is limited scholarly work on this issue.
However, it appears that their numbers are on the rise, primarily because of the NAF’s unavailability. For example, between
29
1958 and July 2009 only three circuits (the Second, Ninth,
and Eleventh) had ruled on what to do in an exclusive arbitra30
tion forum dispute. In the almost six year period since July
2009, that number has doubled with the Third, Fifth, and Sev31
enth Circuits also ruling on this issue and with yet another
exclusive arbitration dispute coming before the Eleventh Cir32
cuit. This is unsurprising when one considers that the NAF,
the largest provider of commercial debt arbitration services be33
fore shutting down, handled 214,000 claims in 2006 alone.
Moreover, based on articles published in magazines and online,
it is apparent that this issue is becoming widespread enough to
34
garner the attention of attorneys practicing arbitration law.
28. See Robert Berner & Brian Grow, Banks vs. Consumers (Guess Who
Wins), BUS. WK., June 16, 2008, at 072–74 (“NAF presents its service in print
and online advertising as quicker and less expensive than litigation but every
bit as unbiased. Its Web site promotes ‘a fair, efficient, and effective system for
the resolution of commercial and civil disputes in America and worldwide.’ But
internal NAF documents and interviews with people familiar with the firm
reveal a different reality. Behind closed doors, NAF sells itself to lenders as an
effective tool for collecting debts. The point of these pitches is to persuade the
companies to use the firm to resolve clashes over delinquent accounts. . . . At
times, NAF does this kind of marketing with the aid of law firms representing
the very creditors it’s trying to sign up as clients.”).
29. One of the first (if not the first) exclusive arbitration forum disputes
occurred in 1958. See Delma Eng’g Corp. v. K & L Constr. Co., 174 N.Y.S.2d
620, 621 (App. Div. 1958).
30. See Reddam v. KPMG LLP, 457 F.3d 1054, 1059–61 (9th Cir. 2006),
abrogated on other grounds by Atl. Nat’l Trust LLC v. Mt. Hawley Ins. Co.,
621 F.3d 931, 940 (9th Cir. 2010); Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 211
F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir. 2000); In re Salomon Inc. S’holders’ Derivative
Litig., 68 F.3d 554, 557–61 (2d Cir. 1995).
31. See Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 724 F.3d 787 (7th Cir.
2013); Khan v. Dell Inc., 669 F.3d 350, 353–57 (3d Cir. 2012); Ranzy v.
Tijerina, 393 F. App’x 174 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
32. See Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 768 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2014).
33. Nancy A. Welsh, What Is “(Im)partial Enough” in a World of Embedded Neutrals, 30 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 495, 538 (2010).
34. See, e.g., Christopher J. Karacic & Howard S. Suskin, When the Arbitration Forum Is Unavailable: What Happens Next?, ALTERNATIVE DISP.
RESOL., Winter 2014, at 2, 5 (“Ultimately, the Supreme Court may be called
upon to resolve the split among the circuits . . . . The issue is particularly salient because the NAF—a once-popular and oft-chosen arbitration forum—has
become unavailable for all consumer arbitrations.”); William A. Schreiner, Jr.,
Is an Arbitration Agreement Valid if the Designated Arbitrator Is Unavailable??,
LEXOLOGY
(Oct.
2,
2013),
http://www.lexology.com/library/
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One might assume that the NAF’s impact on creating exclusive arbitration disputes is over, now that it has been nearly
six years since the NAF stopped accepting consumer arbitrations. However, that assumption would be incorrect. It is unclear how many people have active contracts designating the
NAF as the exclusive arbitration forum, but Swanson’s complaint noted that MBNA/Bank of America, JP MorganChase,
Citigroup, Discover Card, Deutsche Financial, and American
Express were, at the time, processing claims in the NAF under
35
pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses. If large credit card
companies like these designated the NAF as an exclusive arbitration forum, one can only imagine how many smaller companies did the same. Thus, although these large, sophisticated
companies have likely updated their contracts with their consumers to write out the NAF as the exclusive arbitration fo36
rum, it is unlikely that all of these smaller, less sophisticated
companies have done the same. This is not mere conjecture; after conducting a brief online search, this author found a number, and variety, of companies that still list the NAF as the exclusive arbitration forum under the Terms and Conditions
found on their websites—websites that have been updated
37
since July 2009. Therefore, while the numbers may be uncertain, it is clear a large number of active contracts exist that still
detail.aspx?g=3b8fd87e-cf63-4655-9c06-ce2c650570c2 (discussing a Virginia
Supreme Court ruling on this issue).
35. Complaint at 5, Swanson v. Nat’l Arbitration Forum, Inc. (July 14,
2009) (No. 27CV0918550), 2009 WL 2029918.
36. For example, in new contracts with customers, Discover Card and
American Express both designate the American Arbitration Association or
JAMS as the exclusive arbitration forum. Cardmember Agreement: Part 2 of 2,
AM. EXPRESS 1, 5 (Dec. 31, 2014), http://web.aexp-static.com/us/content/
pdf/cardmember-agreements/green/AmericanExpressGreenCard.pdf; Interactive
Guide:
Arbitration,
DISCOVER,
http://www.discover.com/credit
-cards/cardmember-agreement/arbitration.html (last updated Dec. 31, 2014).
37. See Terms and Conditions, DYNAVOX, http://www.dynavoxtech.com/
terms-and-conditions (last visited Apr. 3, 2015) (belonging to a tablet and app
company with a website copyright of 2014); Terms and Conditions,
LEADERSHIP INST. LAS VEGAS, http://www.leadlv.com/terms-and-conditions
(last visited Apr. 3, 2015) (belonging to a leadership program, sponsored by the
Las Vegas Metro Chamber of Commerce, with a website copyright of 2015);
Terms
&
Conditions,
MYPAYDAYCASHADVANCELOANS.COM,
http://
mypaydaycashadvanceloans.com/terms-and-conditions.aspx (last visited Apr.
3, 2015) (belonging to a loan company with a website copyright of 2012); Terms
&
Conditions
/
Privacy
Policy,
FIX
IT
TODAY,
http://www
.fixittoday.com/tcp.php (last visited Apr. 3, 2015) (belonging to an auto repair
company with a website copyright of 2015); Terms of Use, RENOVATION READY,
http://www.renovationready.com/about/terms-of-use (last visited Apr. 3, 2015)
(belonging to a home remodeling loan company with a website copyright of
2014).
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list the NAF as the exclusive arbitration forum. Therefore, potentially hundreds of lawsuits could still arise over the NAF being unavailable to arbitrate. Indeed, a number of court decisions have even involved contracts that designated the NAF as
the exclusive arbitration forum and were signed by the parties
after July 2009, including Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Illinois,
38
LLC.
Additionally, contracts involving the NAF do not have a
monopoly over this issue; some of the recent cases involving exclusive arbitration forum disputes have arisen over forums
39
completely separate from the NAF. And even if the NAF’s effect on the rising number of exclusive arbitration forum disputes peters out, what happened with the NAF could happen
again. For example, “[v]ery often parties designate the American Arbitration Association (AAA) as the forum in which disputes will be heard and determined, and specify AAA rules for
40
commercial and other types of disputes to control the process.”
Thus, the same thing would happen if the AAA were to stop accepting consumer arbitrations like the NAF, which is not entirely implausible since the AAA has been accused of fraudu41
lent activities in the past and issued a moratorium on
commercial arbitration for a period around the time Swanson
42
filed her complaint against the NAF. Therefore, it is unlikely
that this issue will become obsolete any time soon.
In sum, there are a number of reasons why a forum might

38. Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 724 F.3d 787, 788–89 (7th Cir.
2013) (signed May 8, 2012); see, e.g., Crewe v. Rich Dad Educ., LLC, 884 F.
Supp. 2d 60, 66–67 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (signed March 9, 2011); Meskill v. GGNSC
Stillwater Greeley LLC, 862 F. Supp. 2d 966, 969 (D. Minn. 2012) (signed September 9, 2009); Riley v. Extendicare Health Facilities, Inc., 826 N.W.2d 398,
401 (Wis. Ct. App. 2012) (signed June 3, 2010).
39. See, e.g., Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 768 F.3d 1346, 1348 (11th Cir.
2014) (involving the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Nation as the designated
arbitration forum).
40. Robert N. Rapp & Alexander B. Reich, AAA Shakes Up ADR with New
Rules To Permit Appeals of Arbitration Awards, LEXOLOGY (Nov. 6, 2013),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=1d466bd0-aeff-43e5-96b9
-def338ff7baf; see, e.g., Terms and Conditions, STUDENT LOAN COALITION,
http://www.studentloancoalition.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=
article&id=6&Itemid=104 (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
41. See Pam Martens, How Citigroup Stays Fraud-Proof, SALON (Sept. 8,
2012), http://www.salon.com/2012/09/08/how_citigroup_stays_fraud_proof.
42. Mark Cohen, Minnesota AG To Testify in D.C. Today; AAA Puts Moratorium on Consumer Debt Cases, MINN. LAW. (July 22, 2009), http://
minnlawyer.com/2009/07/22/minnesota-ag-to-testify-in-d-c-today-aaa-puts
-moratorium-on-consumer-debt-cases.
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43

refuse to hear a party’s dispute. However, the fact that the
NAF is no longer accepting arbitrations has been by far the
most common reason within the last five years, and it appears
to be the reason why the number of these disputes has been on
the rise. Although it is unclear how many contracts exist with,
or how many lawsuits are filed over, exclusive arbitration forum agreements, one can surmise that this will continue to be
an active issue in the coming years. Nevertheless, while a forum’s refusal may be why the parties are fighting, issues also
arise once they bring their dispute to court.
B. THE APPROACHES COURTS TAKE WHEN DECIDING WHETHER
TO ARBITRATE OR ADJUDICATE AN EXCLUSIVE ARBITRATION
FORUM DISPUTE
Generally, courts face two types of interpretation issues
when deciding whether to send parties with an exclusive arbitration forum clause to arbitration or to adjudicate their dispute. First, courts must use contract law to interpret the par44
ties’ contract and its arbitration clause, and contract law
45
varies from state to state. Second, courts face issues of statutory interpretation because their ability to appoint a new arbi46
trator arises from statute. Though some state courts have as47
sumed this power from state statute, most state courts and all
federal courts gain authority from the Federal Arbitration Act
48
(FAA) to appoint a new arbitrator. Specifically, 9 U.S.C. § 5
states:
If in the agreement provision be made for a method of naming or appointing an arbitrator or arbitrators or an umpire, such method shall
be followed; but if no method be provided therein, or if a method be
provided and any party thereto shall fail to avail himself of such
method, or if for any other reason there shall be a lapse in the naming
43. See supra notes 15–21 and accompanying text.
44. See Zechman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 742 F.
Supp. 1359, 1364 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (“An arbitration provision, like any other
binding agreement between parties, is a creature of contract, and therefore a
party can be compelled to arbitrate only to the extent he has so agreed.” (citation omitted)).
45. Charles L. Knapp, Opting Out or Copping Out?: An Argument for
Strict Scrutiny of Individual Contracts, 40 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 95, 116 (2006)
(“[T]he rules governing contract enforcement vary from state to state . . . .”).
46. See Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 724 F.3d 787, 792–93 (7th
Cir. 2013) (using 9 U.S.C. § 5 to appoint a new arbitrator); Khan v. Dell Inc.,
669 F.3d 350, 356–57 (3d Cir. 2012) (same).
47. See, e.g., New Port Richey Med. Investors, LLC v. Stern ex rel.
Petscher, 14 So. 3d 1084, 1087 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (using the Florida
Arbitration Code to appoint a new arbitrator).
48. See 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2012).
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of an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, or in filling a vacancy, then
upon the application of either party to the controversy the court shall
designate and appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, as the
case may require, who shall act under the said agreement with the
same force and effect as if he or they had been specifically named
therein; and unless otherwise provided in the agreement the arbitra49
tion shall be by a single arbitrator.

Although courts use contract and statutory law when trying to resolve this issue, they vary widely in how they apply
50
them. This Section discusses the three general approaches
that courts have used in determining whether to litigate a case
or send it to arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 5.
1. Approach #1: The Integral-Ancillary Test
The vast majority of courts use the “Integral-Ancillary
Test” when determining how to treat an exclusive arbitration
51
forum clause under 9 U.S.C. § 5. This test originates from
52
Zechman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., but
Brown v. ITT Consumer Financial Corp. provides the most cit53
ed form of the test :
Where the chosen forum is unavailable . . . or has failed for some reason, [9 U.S.C.] § 5 applies and a substitute arbitrator may be named.
Only if the choice of forum is an integral part of the agreement to arbitrate, rather than an “ancillary logistical concern” will the failure of
54
the chosen forum preclude arbitration.

Even though this test is the majority rule, courts apply it
differently. Courts generally accept that rules of contract inter55
pretation decide whether the choice of forum is integral or not.
However, some courts only look to the plain language of the

49. Id. (emphasis added).
50. See Grant v. Magnolia Manor-Greenwood, Inc., 678 S.E.2d 435, 438–
39 (S.C. 2009).
51. Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Front, 745 S.E.2d 556, 567 (W. Va. 2013)
(“This [integral-ancillary] formulation of the application of section 5 of the
FAA is the majority rule.”).
52. Zechman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 742 F. Supp.
1359, 1364–66 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
53. See Miller v. GGNSC Atlanta, LLC, 746 S.E.2d 680, 685 (Ga. Ct. App.
2013) (“The integral term vs. ancillary logistical concern test articulated by
Brown has been adopted by the large majority of jurisdictions . . . .” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
54. Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 211 F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir.
2000) (citations omitted) (quoting Zechman, 742 F. Supp. at 1364).
55. See Klima v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc’y, No. 10-cv1390-JAR-JPO, 2011 WL 5412216, at *3 (D. Kan. Nov. 8, 2011) (“To determine
whether selection of a specific arbitrator is integral to the entire agreement,
courts refer to general principles of contract interpretation.”).
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contract in making the integral-ancillary determination. Other courts emphasize that a choice of forum cannot be integral
without a showing that it was integral to the parties when they
57
entered into the contract via external evidence. Still other
courts examine a combination of contractual plain language
58
and other, external evidence, such as party testimony.
As for the plain language of the contract, some courts rely
heavily on whether the contract contains an “express state59
ment” designating a particular arbitration forum as exclusive.
Others find that an implied statement of exclusivity is enough
60
to make the forum integral. As for external evidence, a number of courts examine the forum’s rules or code of procedures
61
when deciding if the forum is integral, but other courts hold
that a forum’s rules and procedures have no effect on whether
62
the forum is integral. Altogether, while the Integral-Ancillary
Test may be the majority rule, courts vary widely in how they
apply it.

56. See, e.g., id. (noting that the court only needs to look to the terms of
the agreement to determine the parties’ intent); Branch v. Sickert, No. 2:10CV-128-RWS, 2011 WL 796783, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 28, 2011) (looking only to
the terms of the contract in deciding whether the choice of forum was integral).
57. See, e.g., Meskill v. GGNSC Stillwater Greeley LLC, 862 F. Supp. 966,
975 (D. Minn. 2012) (noting, first, that the plaintiff offered no evidence that
designating the NAF as the arbitration forum was important to either party
when entering into the contract); New Port Richey Med. Investors, LLC v.
Stern ex rel. Petscher, 14 So. 3d 1084, 1087 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (same).
58. See, e.g., Jones v. GGNSC Pierre LLC, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1167–68
(D.S.D. 2010) (looking to the language of the contract and to the testimony of
the plaintiff).
59. See, e.g., Reddam v. KPMG LLP, 457 F.3d 1054, 1060 (9th Cir. 2006)
(“We see no evidence that the choice was integral here—in fact, there was not
even an express statement that the NASD would be the arbitrator.”), abrogated on other grounds by Atl. Nat’l Trust LLC v. Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 621 F.3d
931 (9th Cir. 2010); Geneva-Roth, Capital, Inc. v. Edwards, 956 N.E.2d 1195,
1202 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (“At a minimum, for the selection of an arbitrator to
be ‘integral’, the arbitration clause must include an express statement designating a specific arbitrator.”).
60. See, e.g., Riley v. Extendicare Health Facilities, Inc., 826 N.W.2d 398,
406 (Wis. Ct. App. 2012) (“Even without the express use of the term ‘exclusively,’ the Indiana Supreme Court found the . . . provision integral to the agreement . . . .”).
61. See, e.g., Miller v. GGNSC Atlanta, LLC, 746 S.E.2d 680, 686 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2013) (taking into account the fact that NAF’s Code of Procedure states
that only the NAF may apply it).
62. See, e.g., Wright v. GGNSC Holdings LLC, 2011 SD 95, ¶ 19, 808
N.W.2d 114, 120 (finding of “little significance” the fact that the NAF rules
state that only the NAF may apply them).
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2. Approach #2: The Exclusivity Test
A few other courts have followed a second approach, here
termed the “Exclusivity Test.” Instead of debating the importance, or integrality, of the arbitration forum, the court
simply focuses on whether the contract specifies that arbitra63
tion can only be conducted by a single arbitration forum. If it
64
does, the court holds that it must adjudicate the dispute. If it
does not, the court holds that it must submit the dispute to ar65
bitration. However, courts applying this test may interpret
the same basic contract language differently. For example,
when faced with contractual language specifying arbitration by
the rules or procedures of a particular forum, the Second Circuit decided the forum was exclusive and the Seventh Circuit
66
decided it was not.
3. Approach #3: Arbitration Bias
Finally, a couple of early courts faced with exclusive arbitration forum disputes simply opted to submit the case to arbi67
tration. These courts appear to have assumed that if the parties agreed to arbitration, arbitrating was their intent and the
68
forum was secondary. This Note will not discuss this approach
further, as it was only followed by a few courts that faced this
69
issue over thirty years ago.

63. See, e.g., Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 724 F.3d 787, 789–91
(7th Cir. 2013) (looking at whether the language of the contract exclusively
designates an arbitration forum).
64. See In re Salomon Inc. S’holders’ Derivative Litig., 68 F.3d 554, 561
(2d Cir. 1995) (holding 9 U.S.C. § 5 inapplicable because the court had read
the contract as designating arbitration before only the New York Stock Exchange).
65. See Green, 724 F.3d at 789–91, 793 (holding that, because the court
had interpreted the contract to contain just an arbitration clause, it could use
9 U.S.C. § 5 to appoint a new arbitrator).
66. Compare id. at 788–91 (finding an agreement to resolve all disputes
under the Code of Procedure of the NAF did not name the forum as the exclusive arbitrator), with Salomon, 68 F.3d at 557 (finding an agreement to arbitrate disputes according to the NYSE Constitution and rules named the NYSE
as the exclusive arbitrator).
67. See Astra Footwear Indus. v. Harwyn Int’l, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 907,
908, 910–11 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff’d, 578 F.2d 1366 (2d Cir. 1978); Delma Eng’g
Corp. v. K & L Constr. Co., 174 N.Y.S.2d 620, 621 (App. Div. 1958).
68. See Delma Eng’g Corp., 174 N.Y.S.2d at 621 (holding that, even
though the agreement provided for arbitration “in accordance with the rules of
the New York Building Congress, Inc.,” the “dominant intent” of the parties
was simply to arbitrate).
69. See, e.g., Astra Footwear, 442 F. Supp. 907.
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Overall, most courts follow the Integral-Ancillary Test,
though a few courts (the Second and Seventh Circuits in par71
ticular) have used the Exclusivity Test. As may be surmised
from this discussion, however, there is significant disparity in
how courts apply these tests. Much of this disparity arises from
differences in how courts interpret contractual language and
the FAA, which will be discussed in Part II.
C. HOW ARBITRATION CAN AFFECT A CASE
Of course, the exclusive arbitration forum dispute only
matters if arbitration actually unfairly affects the course of a
case. The fact that contentions over exclusive arbitration forum
agreements arise indicates that arbitration must be less desir72
able than litigation to at least some parties, like Joyce Green.
However, critics vary on whether arbitration is actually unfair
73
and whether it affects the outcome of a case.
Many supporters of arbitration argue that the costs of arbi74
tration are lower than the costs of litigation. These lower
costs, they contend, make arbitration forums more accessible
75
than the court system. Moreover, supporters of arbitration often point to the fact that studies comparing arbitration and litigation are largely inconclusive and therefore argue that there
76
is no evidence that plaintiffs fare worse in arbitration.
On the other hand, the arbitration system has many critics, and some directly challenge the merits of the arbitration
system that its advocates put forth. Mark Budnitz argues that
“[a]n examination of the fees charged by arbitration service
70. Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Front, 745 S.E.2d 556, 567 (W. Va. 2013);
see, e.g., supra notes 51–62.
71. See, e.g., Green, 724 F.3d at 789–91, 793; Salomon, 68 F.3d at 561.
72. See Green, 724 F.3d at 788–89; supra notes 11–13 and accompanying
text.
73. See David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1247, 1249–53 (2009) (discussing some of the arguments
over whether arbitration is fair).
74. See Steven C. Bennett & Dean A. Calloway, A Closer Look at the Raging Consumer Arbitration Debate, DISP. RESOL. J., May/Oct. 2010, at 28, 31
(“As a general proposition, arbitration is quicker and cheaper than traditional
litigation.”); accord Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in
the Debate over Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST.
J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559, 561 (2001).
75. See Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration: Why It’s Better
Than It Looks, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 783, 791 (2008) (“One study concluded that litigation is not a plausible option for employees below around the
$60,000 income level, but arbitration is a realistic alternative.”).
76. See Schwartz, supra note 73, at 1259.
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providers demonstrates that the costs are often so high consumers are denied access to arbitration and, therefore, to any
77
dispute-resolution forum.” Budnitz goes on to examine the
costs of using various arbitration forums and how they can be
78
prohibitive for a party.
David Schwartz argues that studies examining whether
arbitration affects the ultimate outcome of the case have gen79
erally used flawed methodology. After reinterpreting the data
of a well-known arbitration versus litigation study, Schwartz
80
notes that the results seem to be pro-defendant. He also argues that while defendants are likely to prefer arbitration,
81
plaintiffs usually only prefer arbitration for low stakes claims.
For high-cost/high-stakes claims, plaintiffs prefer the court system because the arbitration evidentiary and discovery systems
make it more difficult for the plaintiff to meet his or her burden
82
of proof.
Other critics of the arbitration system question the accountability and transparency of arbitration; arbitration
awards are subject to limited review, and arbitrators generally
83
do not need to articulate reasons for their decisions. Additionally, U.S. citizens expect a “day in court,” and arbitration deprives parties of that, often to the disappointment of the non84
sophisticated party. Therefore, while the proponents of arbi77. Mark E. Budnitz, The High Cost of Mandatory Consumer Arbitration,
67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133, 135 (2004).
78. Id. at 136–44. But see Christopher R. Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration
Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 754–56 (arguing that arbitration costs are
very likely not prohibitive).
79. See Schwartz, supra note 73, at 1284–97.
80. See id. at 1297–1308.
81. See id. at 1269–74; cf. Drahozal, supra note 78, at 749–50 (arguing
that enforcing pre-dispute arbitration agreements is not unfair because the
individual has agreed to give up the right to adjudicate rare, high-dollar
claims in exchange for the ability to arbitrate more common, low-dollar
claims).
82. See Schwartz, supra note 73, at 1274–77. But see Drahozal, supra note
78, at 752–53 (arguing that arbitration can be beneficial to an individual because it can limit costly discovery).
83. See Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem of Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 279, 300–01 (2004). But see
Drahozal, supra note 78, at 753 (contending that giving up the right to appeal
in exchange for arbitration may be advantageous for parties because it saves
in costs and often corrections on appeal are for lawmaking purposes); cf. Daniel R. Strader, Bridging the Gap: Amending the Federal Arbitration Act To Allow Discovery of Nonparties, 41 STETSON L. REV. 909, 933–34 (2012) (arguing
that, because arbitration results are final, awards are disbursed more quickly,
thereby benefitting parties).
84. See Reuben, supra note 83, at 310 (“Anecdotal evidence suggests that
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tration argue otherwise, its critics articulate a number of ways
in which the arbitration system can unfairly affect a case.
Thus, a party facing an exclusive arbitration forum dispute
may have a legitimate concern in wanting to keep the case in
litigation, rather than letting the court remand it to arbitration.
II. THE COURTS’ PROBLEMATIC TREATMENT OF
EXCLUSIVE ARBITRATION FORUM DISPUTES
As Part I discussed, courts take different approaches when
interpreting the same contractual language and FAA statutory
85
provision. These different approaches create problems for parties by making it difficult for them to predict how a court will
interpret a contract with an exclusive arbitration forum clause.
As such, Section A discusses some of the issues with how courts
have interpreted exclusive arbitration forum agreements.
Moreover, these approaches may be inconsistent with the FAA,
which is discussed in Section B.
A. ISSUES WITH THE WAYS COURTS INTERPRET EXCLUSIVE
ARBITRATION FORUM CLAUSES
Multiple issues exist with regard to how courts have decided to interpret contracts with exclusive arbitration forum
clauses. Subsection 1 illustrates the contradictory ways courts
have interpreted the same basic contractual language of exclusive arbitration forum agreements. Subsection 2 examines the
courts’ infrequent use of external evidence when deciding exclusive arbitration agreements and why that is problematic.
Finally, Subsection 3 discusses how most contracts with an exclusive arbitration forum clause are contracts of adhesion and
how the courts consider (or neglect to consider) this fact when
deciding disputes arising under them.
1. Contradictions in How Courts Interpret the Contractual
Language of Exclusive Arbitration Forum Agreements
It is well-known that principles of contract interpretation
86
vary from state to state. This fact is demonstrated by the preceding discussion of exclusive arbitration forum disputes, as
courts take widely different approaches when interpreting exmany are shocked and dismayed when they learn that they no longer have
that right [to a day in court] because of an arbitration clause buried in the fine
print.”).
85. See supra Part I.B.
86. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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87

clusive arbitration forum agreements. Doing so is within the
courts’ prerogatives; however, one troublesome issue lies in the
fact that courts have interpreted the exact same, or at least
substantially similar, contractual language differently. To illustrate this point, this Subsection discusses how courts have read
two common examples of contractual language establishing an
exclusive arbitration forum agreement.
a. “In Accordance with the Procedures of an Arbitration
Forum”
A large number of contracts contain language specifying
that arbitration will be conducted in accordance with a specific
88
arbitration forum’s rules or code of procedure. Courts using
89
the Integral-Ancillary Test have held both ways when applying the test to this language. Some courts have found that this
language indicating the procedure of a particular forum thereby makes the forum integral to the parties’ agreement and
that, since the forum is unavailable for arbitration, the court
should litigate the case. Other courts, instead emphasizing the
overarching agreement to arbitrate, have found that this same
basic language does not make the forum integral to the agreement and that the court should thus remand the case to arbi-

87. See supra Part I.B.
88. A number of variations of this language exist, but they all specify the
same basic contractual language. See, e.g., Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill.,
LLC, 724 F.3d 787, 788 (7th Cir. 2013) (“All disputes . . . shall be resolved by
binding arbitration by one arbitrator by and under the Code of Procedure of
the National Arbitration Forum.”); Ranzy v. Tijerina, 393 F. App’x 174, 175
(5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (“You and we agree that any and all claims, disputes, or controversies . . . shall be resolved by binding individual (and not
class) arbitration by and under the Code of Procedure of the National Arbitration Forum.”); Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 211 F.3d 1217, 1220 (11th
Cir. 2000) (“The Agreement contains an arbitration clause which provides that
ITT and the employee ‘agree that any dispute between them . . . shall be resolved by binding arbitration under the Code of Procedure of the National Arbitration Forum.’ ”); Branch v. Sickert, No. 2:10-CV-128-RWS, 2011 WL
796783, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 28, 2011) (“[A]ny controversy . . . shall be settled
by arbitration . . . in accordance with the rules of the Board of Governors of the
National
Association
of
Securities
Dealers
then
in
effect
. . . .”); Miller v. GGNSC Atlanta, LLC, 746 S.E.2d 680, 682 (Ga. Ct. App.
2013) (“[A]ll claims . . . shall be resolved exclusively by binding arbitration . . .
in accordance with the National Arbitration Forum Code of Procedure . . . .”);
Stewart v. GGNSC-Canonsburg, L.P., 9 A.3d 215, 217 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010)
(“[T]he agreement states that this binding arbitration shall be conducted ‘in
accordance with [the NAF] Code of Procedure, which is hereby incorporated
into this agreement.’ ” (alteration in original)).
89. See supra Part I.B.1.
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90

tration.
Courts finding the forum to be integral based on just the
contractual language have emphasized the repeated use of the
91
forum’s name in the contract, that the contract used mandatory language to indicate that the parties should use the forum’s
92
rules or procedures, and that the parties designated one arbi93
trator throughout. Courts have often tied this latter point into
an “express statement” discussion, which, as discussed above,
courts have sometimes found indicative of a forum being inte94
gral to the agreement. In cases where the contract specifies
the NAF’s Code of Procedure, courts have also stressed the fact
that the NAF’s Code of Procedure states that only the NAF
95
may administer it.
90. Compare, e.g., Meskill v. GGNSC Stillwater Greeley LLC, 86 F. Supp.
2d 966, 977 (D. Minn. 2012) (“[T]he Court concludes that even if Meskill were
correct that the Arbitration Agreement mandated arbitration before the NAF,
the forum’s unavailability simply results in a ‘lapse’ under 9 U.S.C. § 5 that
the Court must remedy by appointing a substitute arbitrator.”), with Ranzy,
393 F. App’x at 176 (“Thus, a federal court need not compel arbitration in a
substitute forum if the designated forum becomes unavailable.”).
91. Klima v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc’y, No. 10-cv-1390JAR-JPO, 2011 WL 5412216, at *3 (D. Kan. Nov. 8, 2011) (“Defendant’s form
arbitration agreement names the NAF specifically and exclusively throughout
the agreement. . . . [T]hese provisions show that the parties intended to select
the NAF as the exclusive arbitrator.”); Rivera v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc.,
2011-NMSC-033, ¶ 38, 150 N.M. 398, 259 P.3d 803 (“The pervasive references
to the NAF in the contract compel our conclusion that the parties intended for
the NAF to be the exclusive arbitrator in any out-of-court dispute resolution.”).
92. See Miller, 746 S.E.2d at 686 (“The Arbitration Agreement’s use of the
mandatory [language,] together with its express incorporation of the NAF
Code, indicates that the parties . . . contracted to arbitrate only before the
NAF.”); Geneva-Roth, Capital, Inc. v. Edwards, 956 N.E.2d 1195, 1203 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2011) (“The express designation of the NAF as the arbitration provider in addition to the use of mandatory, as opposed to permissive, contractual
language demonstrates that the parties intended that the NAF was integral to
the arbitration agreement.”); Rivera, 2011-NMSC-033, ¶ 31, 150 N.M. 398, 259
P.3d 803 (“Mandatory, as opposed to permissive, contractual language further
demonstrates that a specifically named arbitration provider is integral to the
agreement to arbitrate.”); cf. Ranzy, 393 F. App’x at 175 (emphasizing the fact
that the contract used the term “shall”).
93. See Rivera, 2011-NMSC-033, ¶ 32, 150 N.M. 398, 259 P.3d 803 (“In
this case, [the] contract names the NAF specifically and exclusively throughout . . . .”).
94. See Geneva-Roth, 956 N.E.2d at 1202 (“At a minimum, for the selection of an arbitrator to be ‘integral’, the arbitration clause must include an express statement designating a specific arbitrator. An express designation of a
single arbitration provider weighs in favor of a finding that the designated
provider is integral to the agreement to arbitrate.” (citations omitted)); see also
supra Part I.B.1.
95. NAT’L ARBITRATION FORUM, CODE OF PROCEDURE 1 (2008), available
at
http://www.adrforum.com/users/odr/resources/Employment/CODEof
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Other courts have directly rejected these arguments, finding the arbitration forum not integral based on the contractual
language—even after considering party testimony. Several
courts have held that the language “in accordance” with the
NAF’s Code of Procedure is not strong enough to designate, ex96
plicitly, arbitration before the NAF (though one court suggested that “by and under the Code of Procedure of the [NAF]”
would have been explicit enough to make the NAF integral to
97
the agreement). Another court has held that, even though the
NAF’s Code says only the NAF can administer it, it is of little
98
significance. Moreover, a few courts have held the forum to be
not integral simply because they found no evidence to the contrary, presumably based primarily on the court’s reading of the
99
language of the contract itself.
Procedure2008.pdf (“This Code shall be administered only by the National Arbitration Forum . . . .”); see, e.g., Klima, 2011 WL 5412216, at *4 (holding that
the fact that the NAF’s Code of Procedure states that only the NAF may employ it “strengthens the Court’s finding that the parties exclusively selected
the NAF”); Stewart v. GGNSC-Canonsburg, L.P., 9 A.3d 215, 220 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2010) (emphasizing that the contract specified arbitration under the NAF
Code, which says that only NAF members may apply it).
96. See Meskill v. GGNSC Stillwater Greeley LLC, 862 F. Supp. 2d 966,
969, 976 (D. Minn. 2012) (stating that the arbitration agreement, which stated
that disputes must be resolved “in accordance” with the NAF Code of Procedure, only implicitly designated arbitration before the NAF and therefore undermines the idea that the NAF was integral to the agreement); Jones v.
GGNSC Pierre LLC, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1167 (D.S.D. 2010) (“In between
those provisions [designating that disputes are to be resolved by arbitration
and not by a court] is the language specifying resolution ‘in accordance with
the National Arbitration Forum Code of Procedure.’ The clause at issue does
not mandate the NAF per se . . . .”).
97. Meskill, 862 F. Supp. at 969, 976 (holding that the arbitration clause
before the court, which contained the phrase “in accordance with the [NAF]
Code of Procedure,” did not include an express designation of an arbitration
forum, distinguishing it from the arbitration clause before the Fifth Circuit in
Ranzy, which contained the language “by and under the Code of Procedure of
the [NAF]” and which, the court argued, more clearly mandated the NAF).
98. See Wright v. GGNSC Holdings LLC, 2011 SD 95, ¶¶ 17–21, 808
N.W.2d 114, 119–21 (“We conclude that designation of the NAF Code of Procedure did not require an ‘NAF arbitrator’; a substitute arbitrator could apply
common procedural rules like those found in the NAF Code of Procedure and
public domain . . . .”).
99. See Reddam v. KPMG LLP, 457 F.3d 1054, 1060–61 (9th Cir. 2006),
(explaining only that the arbitration forum is not integral because there was
no express statement that the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.
(NASD) would be the arbitrator and no evidence that the NASD was central to
the agreement), abrogated on other grounds by Atl. Nat’l Trust LLC v. Mt.
Hawley Ins. Co., 621 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2010); Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin.
Corp., 211 F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding only that “[h]ere there is
no evidence that the choice of the NAF as the arbitration forum was an integral part of the agreement to arbitrate”).

2015] EXCLUSIVE ARBITRATION FORUM CLAUSES

2023

The Second and Seventh Circuits are alone in using the
100
Exclusivity Test approach, and both adopted this approach
101
when faced with this contractual language. The Salomon
court (Second Circuit) held that the contract’s language clearly
designated arbitration “by the NYSE [New York Stock Ex102
change] and only the NYSE.” On the other hand, though the
NAF’s Code of Procedure states that only the NAF can apply it,
the Green court (Seventh Circuit) held that, as other arbitration forums could still technically use the NAF’s Code of Proce103
dure, the agreement was not exclusive.
What a court may accept as a valid argument when faced
with “under the procedure of” contractual language in an arbitration agreement is largely ambiguous. However, this phrase
does not hold a monopoly on ambiguity in exclusive arbitration
forum clauses.
b. “Shall Be Resolved by Arbitration Administered by a
Particular Arbitration Forum”
Another type of contract that has come before the courts
specifies that any disputes between the parties shall be resolved by arbitration administered by a particular arbitration
104
forum. Although this language seems arguably clearer than
100. See supra Part I.B.2.
101. Compare Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 724 F.3d 787, 788 (7th
Cir. 2013) (“All disputes, claims or controversies . . . shall be resolved by binding arbitration by one arbitrator by and under the Code of Procedure of the
National Arbitration Forum.”), with In re Salomon Inc. S’holders’ Derivative
Litig., 68 F.3d 554, 556 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[T]he defendants . . . had signed an
agreement to arbitrate (under the Constitution and rules of the NYSE) any
dispute arising out of their employment by [the plaintiff].”).
102. Salomon, 68 F.3d at 557.
103. See Green, 724 F.3d at 789–90; supra note 95 and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., Khan v. Dell Inc., 669 F.3d 350, 351 (3d Cir. 2012) (“ANY
CLAIM, DISPUTE, OR CONTROVERSY . . . SHALL BE RESOLVED
EXCLUSIVELY
AND
FINALLY
BY
BINDING
ARBITRATION
ADMINISTERED BY THE NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM (NAF) under
its Code of Procedure then in effect . . . .”); Carideo v. Dell, Inc., No. C061772JLR, 2009 WL 3485933, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 26, 2009) (“The arbitration clause provides that any claims related to the Agreement shall be resolved by binding arbitration administered by the National Arbitration Forum
(‘NAF’).”); New Port Richey Med. Investors, LLC v. Stern ex rel. Petscher, 14
So. 3d 1084, 1086 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (“The agreement provided . . . that
any disputes would be submitted to arbitration to be administered by the
American Arbitration Association (the AAA).”); Carr v. Gateway, Inc., 944
N.E.2d 327, 330 (Ill. 2011) (“You agree that any Dispute between You and
Gateway will be resolved exclusively and finally by arbitration administered
by the National Arbitration Forum (NAF) and conducted under its rules
. . . .”); Grant v. Magnolia Manor-Greenwood, Inc., 678 S.E.2d 435, 436–37
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the language discussed in the previous section, courts have still
105
split in their interpretations. Courts considering this contractual language have generally been ones following the IntegralAncillary approach. Courts that have upheld the forum as integral to the agreement under this language have emphasized
106
that the contract clearly sets out the forum as the arbitrator.
On the other hand, at least one court has held that this lan107
guage by itself is not enough to make the forum integral. Yet
another court faced with this language held the forum to be not
integral because the parties did not present external evidence
108
showing that it was.
At least two courts have explicitly found this type of language ambiguous. In both cases, Dell, Inc. was the defendant,
and the contractual language of the arbitration clause specifically stated that disputes “shall be resolved exclusively and finally by binding arbitration administered by the National Arbi109
tration Forum.” The two courts decided that “exclusively”
could modify either “binding arbitration” or “administered by
110
the National Arbitration Forum.”
Ultimately, both courts
held that the identity of the forum was not integral to the
111
agreement because federal policy supports arbitration. How(S.C. 2009) (“Pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, any action, dispute,
claim, or controversy . . . shall be resolved by binding arbitration administered
by the National Health Lawyers Association (the ‘NHLA’).”).
105. Compare, e.g., Khan, 669 F.3d at 357 (“The contract’s language does
not indicate the parties’ unambiguous intent not to arbitrate their disputes if
NAF is unavailable.”), with Carideo, 2009 WL 3485933, at *6 (“[S]election of
NAF is integral to the arbitration clause . . . . To appoint a substitute arbitrator would constitute a wholesale revision of the arbitration clause.”).
106. See Carideo, 2009 WL 3485933, at *4 (“This language clearly and unequivocally selects NAF as the arbitrator, specifies that NAF will apply its own
rules in the arbitration, and does not provide for an alternative arbitral forum.”); cf. Grant, 678 S.E.2d at 437, 439 (holding the forum integral because
the contract mandated “arbitration administered by the National Health Lawyers Association” (now the “AHLA”) and the AHLA has specific rules that the
court felt reflected the parties’ intent to “arbitrate exclusively before that
body”).
107. Carr, 944 N.E.2d at 335 (“[T]he mere fact parties name an arbitral
service to handle arbitrations and specify rules to be applied does not, standing alone, make that designation integral to the agreement.”).
108. See New Port Richey, 14 So. 3d at 1087 (holding the forum not integral
because the appellee did not present evidence to the circuit court showing that
the designation of the AAA was integral to the agreement to arbitrate).
109. Khan, 669 F.3d at 351 (changed from all capitals); Adler v. Dell Inc.,
No. 08-cv-13170, 2009 WL 4580739, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 3, 2009) (same).
110. See Khan, 669 F.3d at 354–55; Adler, 2009 WL 4580739, at *2.
111. See Khan, 669 F.3d at 356–57 (“Although courts are divided on the
issue, we conclude that the ‘liberal federal policy in favor of arbitration’ counsels us to favor the [pro-arbitration] line of cases.”); Adler, 2009 WL 4580739,
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ever, yet another court faced with the same contractual language, and with Dell as the defendant, found that the language
112
unambiguously supports the NAF as the exclusive forum.
Moreover, in these same Dell cases, the court finding for
the plaintiff found the forum integral partially because the contract specified that the NAF would apply its own rules in the
arbitration, and partially because the contract did not provide
113
for an alternate forum. Yet, one of the courts finding for Dell
found the contractual language ambiguous for these same rea114
sons.
Thus, the ways in which courts have at times interpreted
the same basic contractual language are contradictory. This
has the unfortunate effect of making it difficult for parties to
predict how a court will rule on their exclusive arbitration forum contract, particularly when they are before a court that
has not interpreted that specific contractual language at issue
in the parties’ dispute. The disparate holdings discussed in this
Subsection may be more understandable in situations in which
the court took party testimony into account when reaching the
decision; in those cases, it would seem that the different rulings
115
are because of the parties’ different situations.
However,
many of these contradictory decisions are from courts looking

at *4 (“[T]he Sixth Circuit [has] stated that any doubts regarding arbitrability
should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”).
112. See Carideo v. Dell, Inc., No. C06-1772JLR, 2009 WL 3485933, at *4
(W.D. Wash. Oct. 26, 2009).
113. See id. at *4–5 (“This language clearly and unequivocally selects NAF
as the arbitrator, specifies that NAF will apply its own rules in the arbitration, and does not provide for an alternative arbitral forum.”).
114. See Adler, 2009 WL 4580739, at *3 (“[T]he agreement requires NAF
rules be used. This would appear to be mere surplusage, except in the case of a
substitute arbitration forum . . . . Further, the agreement lacks any provision
for a course of conduct in the event that NAF is unavailable or unwilling to
arbitrate disputes between the parties. The lack of an alternative to NAF in
the agreement may be taken as indicating a primary intent to arbitrate all
disputes, or on the other hand, that the parties contemplated arbitration only
if administered by NAF.”).
115. See, e.g., Meskill v. GGNSC Stillwater Greeley LLC, 862 F. Supp. 2d
966, 975 (D. Minn. 2012) (noting that the plaintiff offered no evidence that the
designation of the NAF was important to him or the defendant); Jones v.
GGNSC Pierre LLC, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1168 (D.S.D. 2010) (holding that,
due in part to the plaintiff’s testimony, simply specifying the NAF rules in the
parties’ agreement did not mean that the NAF was integral to the agreement);
Wright v. GGNSC Holdings LLC, 2011 SD 95, ¶ 25, 808 N.W.2d 114, 122 (noting that the NAF Code could not have been integral to the parties’ agreement
because the plaintiff did not raise the unavailability of the NAF Code as a defense—the circuit court did sua sponte).
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solely at the plain contractual language. Indeed, many courts
have neglected to look at external evidence altogether when deciding exclusive arbitration forum disputes.
2. Courts Often Do Not Use Parol Evidence in Deciding
Exclusive Arbitration Forum Disputes
Parol evidence is evidence that is external to the plain language of the contract, and courts may use parol evidence to in117
terpret an ambiguous contract. As indicated, courts often try
to ascertain the parties’ intentions at the time they agreed to
the arbitration clause from the plain language of the contract
118
alone. However, though courts may not acknowledge it, it appears that this approach often yields little more than
judicialized guesswork.
For example, in Stewart v. GGNSC-Canonburg, L.P., the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania discussed how there is comparable authority that supports litigating and that supports arbi119
trating an exclusive arbitration forum dispute. The court proceeded to compare the facts before it to the facts of a case
recently before a federal court in South Dakota, finding them to
120
be very similar. However, the Superior Court rejected the
116. See, e.g., Klima v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc’y, No.
10-cv-1390-JAR-JPO, 2011 WL 5412216, at *3 (D. Kan. Nov. 8, 2011) (“Here,
the terms of the arbitration agreement are clear, and the Court need not look
outside the written agreement to ascertain the parties’ intent.”); Stewart v.
GGNSC-Canonsburg, L.P., 9 A.3d 215, 221 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) (“[T]his Court
will not rewrite an arbitration agreement . . . . Sanctioning this type of action
would run contrary to the clear intent of the parties as expressed by the plain
language of the Agreement itself.”).
117. See Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation, The Parol Evidence Rule and
Admissibility of Extrinsic Evidence To Establish and Clarify Ambiguity in
Written Contract, 40 A.L.R.3D 1384, 1389 (1971) (“[T]here seems to be a . . .
wider recognition of the principle that extrinsic evidence can be introduced to
clarify an ambiguity . . . .”).
118. See, e.g., Diversicare Leasing Corp. v. Nowlin, No. 11-CV-1037, 2011
WL 5827208, at *6 (W.D. Ark. Nov. 18, 2011) (“The plain language of the
agreement shows that the parties’ primary and overriding concern was that
claims in excess of $15,000 be submitted to arbitration, not that they be arbitrated by the NAF.”); Stewart, 9 A.3d at 221 (“[T]his Court will not . . . insert
additional terms . . . . Sanctioning this type of action would run contrary to the
clear intent of the parties as expressed by the plain language of the Agreement
itself.”); see also supra notes 59–62, 91–95 and accompanying text. But see,
e.g., Jones, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 1168 (holding that the plaintiff’s testimony supported a finding that the forum was not integral because she testified that
“she did not negotiate the Arbitration Agreement, did not remember the Arbitration Agreement itself, but did not doubt that she signed the document”).
119. Stewart, 9 A.3d at 219–20.
120. Id. at 220–21.
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federal court’s legal analysis because it concluded that the parties expressly agreed to several terms that, it felt, the federal
121
court had not fully considered. Yet, in doing so, the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania only examined the plain language of the
122
contract. If the Superior Court had considered parol evidence,
the contradictory rulings between the two courts might have
been reconcilable because the Superior Court’s disparate holding would have been based on the parties’ different circumstances between the two cases. Instead, the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania summed up the stance of most courts, which neglect to examine parol evidence: “[T]his Court will not . . . insert
additional terms [into the parties’ agreement]. . . . Sanctioning
this type of action would run contrary to the clear intent of the
parties as expressed by the plain language of the Agreement
123
itself.”
Of course, there is an impediment to courts using parol evidence: the parol evidence rule. The convoluted parol evidence
124
rule is not capable of being definitively stated, but one aspect
of the rule is relevant to this discussion. Courts generally agree
that parol evidence can be used to interpret ambiguous contrac125
tual language. However, conservative courts will only admit
external evidence to interpret a contract if it is ambiguous on
126
its face. Other, more liberal courts will admit external evidence to determine whether a contract is ambiguous, and then
allow parol evidence if the court determines that the contract is
127
ambiguous. For the conservative courts, then, the parol evidence rule may block the admissibility of all external evidence
in an exclusive arbitration forum dispute. If a conservative
court decides that the language is unambiguous on its face, it
128
will only consider the plain language of the contract.
121. Id.
122. See id. at 219–20.
123. Id. at 221.
124. See Ralph James Mooney, A Friendly Letter to the Oregon Supreme
Court: Let’s Try Again on the Parol Evidence Rule, 84 OR. L. REV. 369, 372
(2005).
125. Leonard Marinaccio, III, Out on Parol?: A Critical Examination of the
Alaska Supreme Court’s Application of the Parol Evidence Rule, 11 ALASKA L.
REV. 405, 407 (1994) (“All courts agree that where such language is vague or
ambiguous, the parol evidence rule permits evidence of surrounding circumstances to be introduced . . . to resolve any ambiguity.”).
126. See 11 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 33:42 (4th ed.
2012).
127. Id.
128. See id. (“Generally, the language is to be viewed as a reasonable person, under the circumstances, would view it . . . .”).
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Yet, even for these conservative courts, parol evidence
should be admissible for most exclusive arbitration forum
clauses. There has been controversy over the meaning of a
clause stating that the parties agree to resolve disputes
through binding arbitration administered by a particular fo129
rum, and that clause is arguably more straightforward than
many exclusive arbitration forum clauses. Courts should note
that if other jurisdictions have reached such varied interpretations of this arguably straightforward language, there is likely
enough ambiguity on the face of most exclusive arbitration forum clauses to admit parol evidence.
In sum, because courts often do not use parol evidence
when deciding exclusive arbitration forum disputes even
though they very likely could, they often resort to guesswork,
which undermines contractual predictability for parties. This
problem is even more disconcerting when one considers that
most of the contracts involving an exclusive arbitration forum
clause are contracts of adhesion.
3. Most Exclusive Arbitration Forum Agreements Are
Contracts of Adhesion
In a contract of adhesion, the “accepting party” must agree
to the terms of the “drafting party’s” contract on a “take-it-or130
leave-it” basis. Contracts of adhesion are very common, rang131
ing from insurance policies to credit card agreements. With a
contract of adhesion, the accepting party has no meaningful
132
opportunity to negotiate the terms of the agreement, typically

129. See supra Part II.A.1.
130. See Andrew A. Schwartz, Consumer Contract Exchanges and the Problem of Adhesion, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 313, 346 (2011) (“A ‘contract of adhesion’
in the parlance of contract law, is a take-it-or-leave-it standard form agreement, usually presented to a consumer by a business entity.”). But see Sandra
F. Gavin, Unconscionability Found: A Look at Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration Agreements 10 Years After Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 54 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 249, 267 (2006), for a discussion of the higher definition some
courts have placed on adhesion contracts.
131. See 25 DAVID K. DEWOLF, KELLER W. ALLEN, & DARLENE BARRIER
CARUSO, WASHINGTON PRACTICE SERIES: CONTRACT LAW AND PRACTICE § 9:19
(3d ed. 2014), available at 25 WAPRAC 9:19 (Westlaw) (discussing common
examples of contracts of adhesion); Susan Rabin & Christopher Q. Pham, Contracts of Adhesion, L.A. LAW., Feb. 2006, at 11, 11 (“When people travel, rent
cars, and purchase insurance, for example, they accept form contracts, which
can be a normal . . . way of doing business.”).
132. Schwartz, supra note 130, at 346 (“Negotiation over any of the terms
contained in the form—except, often, the price—is neither contemplated nor
permitted.”).
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133

is not represented by legal counsel, and often does not under134
stand, or even read, the entire agreement. And, unfortunately, but predictably, the vast majority of exclusive arbitration forum disputes arise from contracts of adhesion, with the
135
accepting party bringing the dispute before the court.
Because these disputes are often over contracts of adhesion, many of the fact patterns regarding the plaintiffs in these
136
suits are quite sympathetic. Joyce Green is an example. Geneva-Roth, Capital, Inc. v. Edwards presents another exam137
ple. In Geneva-Roth, Akeala Edwards entered into a loan
agreement that included an exclusive arbitration forum clause
138
with LoanPoint USA for $300.
However, every ten days
LoanPoint USA implemented a finance charge against Edwards, which resulted in over $700 of charges against her over
139
ninety days. Edwards eventually filed a complaint against
LoanPoint USA, asserting that the loan violated Indiana con140
sumer protection law.
These types of fact patterns are common and are not limited to the sphere of small loans. In Meskill v. GGNSC Stillwater Greeley LLC, the nursing facility Golden Living Center
(GLC) admitted Howard Meskill, an eighty-three-year-old man,
141
as a patient. At the time of admission, Meskill signed several
agreements with GLC specifying the NAF as the exclusive arbi133. Cf. New Eng. Eyecare of Waterbury, P.C. v. New Eng. Eyecare, P.C.,
No. 099465, 1991 WL 27919, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 18, 1991) (stating
that the contract before the court was not a contract of adhesion and noting
that both parties were represented by attorneys in its writing).
134. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. b (1981) (“Customers do not in fact ordinarily understand or even read the standard
terms.”); Robert Prentice, Contract-Based Defenses in Securities Fraud Litigation: A Behavioral Analysis, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 337, 360 (“Sensible consumers/investors do not read most of the contracts they sign, and sellers and issuers know this so well that they often dispense with even showing the contract
to the consumer/investor.”).
135. See, e.g., Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 724 F.3d 787, 794 (7th
Cir. 2013) (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (“The payday loan agreement that [the
plaintiff] signed was certainly a contract of adhesion.”); Khan v. Dell Inc., 669
F.3d 350, 351 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting that the plaintiff agreed to the terms of
the agreement by clicking a box on Dell’s website); Miller v. GGNSC Atlanta,
LLC, 746 S.E.2d 680, 682–83 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013) (discussing how the plaintiff
signed the contract as part of an admission packet to a nursing home).
136. See Green, 724 F.3d at 794 (Hamilton, J., dissenting); see also supra
notes 1–10 and accompanying text.
137. 956 N.E.2d 1195 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
138. Id. at 1196–97.
139. Id. at 1197.
140. Id.
141. 862 F. Supp. 2d 966, 969 (D. Minn. 2012).
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142

tral forum. Meskill fell down numerous times during the five
143
months he lived at GLC. During his last fall, Meskill sus144
tained vertebral fractures and died three days later. Meskill’s
son filed suit against GLC, asserting that his father’s falls were
145
a result of the nursing facility’s negligence. Grant v. Magno146
lia Manor-Greenwood, Inc. presents similar facts. The Magnolia Manor-Greenwood nursing home admitted Lessie Grant
as a patient, with her admission contract designating the National Health Lawyers Association as the exclusive arbitral fo147
rum. Grant fell while living at Magnolia Manor-Greenwood,
sustaining a large hematoma above her left eye that she died
148
from five days later. Her surviving husband sued the nursing
149
home for survival, wrongful death, and loss of consortium.
Despite fact patterns that would presumably push courts
to examine the circumstances surrounding the acceptance of
these contracts, courts rarely seem to take the fact that the
contract was a contract of adhesion into account when deciding
an exclusive arbitration forum dispute. For example, in an exclusive arbitration forum dispute, the testimony or record generally shows that the plaintiff(s) did not consider the indicated
150
arbitration forum important when entering into the contract.
Courts then point to a plaintiff’s testimony or the record to
support a decision that the parties simply agreed to arbitration,
stating that this evidence shows that the plaintiff(s) did not
151
consider the arbitration clause as “integral.” This might be
142. Id.
143. Id. at 970.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. 678 S.E.2d 435 (S.C. 2009).
147. Id. at 436–37.
148. Id. at 437.
149. Id.
150. See Selby v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams., No. 12cv01562 AJB
(BGS), 2013 WL 1315841, at *11 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2013) (“Plaintiff has not
established, or even argued, that she would not have entered into the underlying Agreement in the event of NAF’s unavailability to arbitrate the resulting
disputes.”); Meskill, 862 F. Supp. 2d at 975 (“[T]here is nothing in the record
indicating that [the plaintiff] was even aware of the NAF (or its Code) when he
signed the Arbitration Agreement.”); Jones v. GGNSC Pierre LLC, 684 F.
Supp. 2d 1161, 1168 (D.S.D. 2010) (“[The plaintiff] testified that she did not
. . . remember the Arbitration Agreement itself, but did not doubt that she
signed the document . . . .”); Ex parte Warren, 718 So. 2d 45, 49 (Ala. 1998)
(“There is no evidence that [the plaintiff] or [the defendant] intended their
choice of an arbitrator to be an essential term of the contract . . . .”).
151. See, e.g., Jones, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 1168 (“The testimony of Plaintiff
Carol Jones further supports the conclusion that the NAF provision was not
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valid when the courts are dealing with parties with equal bar152
gaining power. However, since most of the contracts involved
in exclusive arbitration forum disputes are contracts of adhesion, the party accepting the contract may not have even understood what the exclusive arbitration forum agreement
meant—and even this presumes that the party read the con153
tract in its entirety, which most do not. Therefore, it is illogical for courts to make these kinds of assumptions about party
testimony regarding contracts of adhesion.
As these last three Subsections have shown, there is a
large amount of disparity in (a) how courts interpret the same
basic contractual language, and (b) what arguments they will
find effective. This disparity makes it difficult for parties to anticipate how a court might rule on the language of their contract. All of this goes against the fundamental policy of contract
154
law: ensuring predictability for parties. Aside from contradictions in how courts have interpreted parties’ contracts, however, another issue exists in how courts have interpreted the
FAA.
B. COURTS MAY BE MISINTERPRETING 9 U.S.C. § 5
Section 5 of 9 U.S.C., enacted as part of the FAA, is generally the source of courts’ power to decide whether to proceed
with a case involving an exclusive arbitration forum dispute or
155
whether to send it to arbitration. Two issues are at play with
regard to 9 U.S.C. § 5. First, courts deciding exclusive arbitration forum disputes seem to be misinterpreting the policy in favor of arbitration as established by the FAA. Second, most
courts are basing their decisions on precedent, without consulting the text of 9 U.S.C. § 5 at all.
1. The Policy in Favor of Arbitration Does Not Compel Courts
To Remand Exclusive Arbitration Forum Agreements to
integral to the arbitration agreement.”).
152. Cf. Hazel Glenn Beh, Reassessing the Sophisticated Insured Exception,
39 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 85, 106–07 (2003) (arguing that a higher
standard probably applies to insurance contracts where both parties had equal
bargaining power and mutually wrote the contract).
153. See Schwartz, supra note 130, at 350 (“[I]t is a commonplace that
practically no one reads, let alone understands, the . . . contracts of adhesion
to which they assent.”).
154. See Steven N. Baker, Foreign Law Between Domestic Commercial Parties: A Party Autonomy Approach with Particular Emphasis on North Carolina
Law, 30 CAMPBELL L. REV. 437, 440 (2008) (noting that predictability and party expectations are fundamental values of contract law).
155. See 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2012); see also supra Part I.B.
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Arbitration
The Supreme Court has often articulated a liberal policy in
156
favor of arbitration in connection with the FAA. Accordingly,
in many situations it seems that courts send cases to arbitra157
tion largely because of pro-arbitration policy, with courts of158
ten citing the FAA as the reason behind this policy. However,
based on the legislative history of the FAA, this may be a hasty
judgment on the courts’ part.
There is essentially no legislative history behind § 5 of the
FAA. However, legislative history exists for the FAA as a
159
whole. United States courts were originally hostile to arbitra160
tion agreements and generally did not enforce them. In the
early twentieth century, business groups began lobbying for
federal legislation that would make arbitration agreements en161
forceable. The result of that lobbying was the FAA, which
Congress passed in 1925 to place arbitration agreements on
162
equal footing with other contract provisions. “A key purpose
156. See, e.g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52,
62 (1995).
157. See, e.g., Khan v. Dell Inc., 669 F.3d 350, 355–56 (3d Cir. 2012) (sending the case to arbitration simply because the court found the language of the
contract ambiguous and had a policy in favor of arbitration); Diversicare Leasing Corp. v. Nowlin, No. 11-CV-1037, 2011 WL 5827208, at *7 (W.D. Ark. Nov.
18, 2011) (“The above facts must be viewed in light of the ‘liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements’ found in the FAA.”).
158. See, e.g., Adler v. Dell Inc., No. 08-cv-13170, 2009 WL 4580739, at *4
(E.D. Mich. Dec. 3, 2009) (“It is difficult to justify the abrogation of an entire
arbitration agreement, especially when Congress has provided in the Federal
Arbitration Act an easy remedy for an arbitrator’s unavailability.”); cf. Green
v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 724 F.3d 787, 792–93 (7th Cir. 2013) (questioning the Integral-Ancillary Test, but noting that “[i]n recent years the Supreme Court has insisted that the Act not be added to in a way that overrides
contracts to resolve disputes by arbitration” and ultimately sending the case to
arbitration).
159. See generally Hal Neth, The Federal Arbitration Act and How It Grew
12–13 (May 2011) (unpublished M.S. essay, University of Oregon), available at
http://adr.uoregon.edu/files/2012/01/federalarbitrationact.pdf (discussing the
history and the development of the FAA).
160. David S. Clancy & Matthew M.K. Stein, An Uninvited Guest: Class
Arbitration and the Federal Arbitration Act’s Legislative History, 63 BUS. LAW.
55, 58 (2007); see also Neth, supra note 159, at 12–13 (discussing how American courts generally refused to enforce arbitration agreements).
161. Neth, supra note 159, at 13.
162. Wilson Daniel “Dee” Miles, III, Partner, Beasley, Allen, Crow,
Methvin, Portis & Miles, P.C., Address at the Conference on Life and Health
Insurance Litigation: Arbitration (May 10, 2001), available at SF81 ALI-ABA
157 (Westlaw) (“Historically, our courts were rightly opposed to arbitration,
and the [FAA] was intended to overcome the longstanding judicial hostility to
arbitration provisions that had existed at English common law and had been
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of the [Federal Arbitration] Act was to make agreements to arbitrate ‘valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
163
contract.’ ”
Thus, Congress enacted the FAA in order to ensure the en164
forceability of arbitration agreements. Still, the history of the
FAA does not suggest that Congress intended the courts to
send all parties with contracts containing any sort of arbitration clause to arbitration. Indeed, the text of the FAA suggests
otherwise; 9 U.S.C. § 4, for example, only gives the courts power to remand any arbitral issue to arbitration “in accordance
165
with the terms of [the parties’] agreement.” In fact, the Supreme Court has recognized this latter point, even in spite of its
166
liberal policy in favor of arbitration. Rather, the legislative
history of the FAA indicates that Congress simply wanted to
ensure that courts do not invalidate arbitration agreements
167
just because they are arbitration agreements.
That is not the issue in exclusive arbitration forum disputes. A party with an exclusive arbitration forum dispute is
not trying to persuade the court that the provision is and al168
ways has been unenforceable. That situation is more directly
169
covered by the FAA’s policy. Instead, the party is trying to
adopted by American courts and to place arbitration agreements upon the
same footing with other contracts.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
163. Neth, supra note 159, at 13–14 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2010)).
164. See supra notes 159–63 and accompanying text.
165. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012) (emphasis added).
166. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 473 (1989) (“But
§ 4 of the FAA does not confer a right to compel arbitration of any dispute at
any time; it confers only the right to obtain an order directing that ‘arbitration
proceed in the manner provided for in [the parties’] agreement.’ ” (alteration in
original) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4)).
167. See Miles, supra note 162 (“A review of the legislative history of the
Act demonstrates that . . . . [i]t was a result of the American Bar Association’s
efforts to obtain Congressional authorization for federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements in . . . interstate commercial contracts.”).
168. See, e.g., In re Salomon Inc. S’holders’ Derivative Litig., 68 F.3d 554,
557 (2d Cir. 1995) (“The question we decide, however, is not whether shareholder suits [like the present case] are arbitrable, but where this dispute—
whatever its nature—may be arbitrated under the agreements.”); see also
Khan v. Dell Inc., 669 F.3d 350, 353 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting that the plaintiff
was not disputing whether the Terms and Agreements governed the contract,
just whether the arbitration provision was still enforceable given that the
NAF is no longer conducting consumer arbitrations).
169. Despite the policy, however, parties may still argue that an arbitration provision is in itself invalid for reasons that a court may find any contractual provision invalid. These reasons include fraud, forgery, mutual mistake,
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convince a court that the arbitration agreement is no longer enforceable given the current circumstances—those being that the
arbitration forum named in the contract cannot, or will not, ar170
bitrate the parties’ dispute. These circumstances are beyond
the scope of what Congress intended when it passed the FAA.
In fact, these decisions arguably go against the Supreme
Court’s instruction that “[c]ourts must rigorously enforce arbi171
tration agreements according to their terms.” In an exclusive
arbitration forum agreement, the terms indicate that the parties, in some fashion, selected a particular arbitration forum to
handle any disputes arising under the contract. Thus, by deciding to send the case to arbitration in another forum simply because of pro-arbitration policy, instead of taking into account
the exclusive designation of the original arbitration forum,
courts may not be enforcing these exclusive arbitration agreements according to their terms.
2. Courts Are Basing Their Decisions on Precedent, Not on the
Text of 9 U.S.C. § 5
Whether the court can use the FAA to appoint a new arbitrator for the parties depends on the court’s interpretation of
172
the term “lapse” in 9 U.S.C. § 5. To have the power to appoint
a new arbitrator, a court must first make a finding that there
was a “lapse in the naming of an arbitrator or arbitrators or
173
umpire.” Courts are to look to the plain language when inter174
preting a statute. According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, the meaning of “lapse” is “a slight error typically due to
175
forgetfulness or inattention.” The Oxford English Dictionary
impossibility, unconscionability, and illegality. See Vimar Seguros y
Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 555 (1995). It is possible
that these defenses may apply to exclusive arbitration forum disputes, but
that is beyond the scope of this Note.
170. See, e.g., Wright v. GGNSC Holdings LLC, 2011 SD 95, ¶¶ 9–10, 808
N.W.2d 114, 117 (noting that the parties “agreed to arbitrate” but that, as the
NAF was specified in the contract and is unavailable, the question is whether
the court can appoint a substitute arbitrator).
171. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013)
(emphasis added) (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213,
221 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
172. See 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2012); see also supra Part I.B.
173. 9 U.S.C. § 5.
174. See Lamie v. U.S. Trs., 504 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (“It is well established
that when the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts . . . is
to enforce it according to its terms.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
175. Lapse,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/lapse (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
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176

similarly defines “lapse” as “a mistake, a slight error.” Therefore, based on the plain language of the statute, a court can only appoint a new arbitrator under 9 U.S.C. § 5 if the parties
made a small, accidental error in the naming of the arbitrator
in the exclusive arbitration forum clause.
One could argue that courts seem to be trying to determine
whether there is a “lapse” through the Integral-Ancillary and
Exclusivity Tests. This is because one could regard asking
whether an arbitration forum is “integral” or “exclusive” as a
way to decide whether the parties intended to arbitrate in general or just via the designated forum and mistakenly agreed to
177
a contract that suggested otherwise. However, if this is a situation of semantics, it would be better for courts to be clear
about what they are looking for in exclusive arbitration forum
clauses rather than leaving that determination up to unclear
tests.
Still, there is a larger issue with the tests courts have been
using—in particular the Integral-Ancillary Test, which the ma178
jority of courts employ. “Integral” and “ancillary” do not ap179
pear anywhere in 9 U.S.C. § 5. Courts coined these terms,
again presumably as tools for determining whether the contract
180
does contain a “lapse” in naming an arbitrator. Unfortunately, these terms now seem to overshadow the actual language of
the statute. For example, when the Third Circuit faced an exclusive arbitration forum dispute for the first time in 2012, the
court never explicitly discussed the language of the statute but
181
spent paragraphs discussing the Integral-Ancillary Test. This
is a problem because courts should not consult precedent before
182
the statutory text and the statute’s purpose or context.
This issue, combined with the problematic ways courts in176. THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1532 (Lesley Brown
ed., 1993).
177. See supra Parts I.B.1–2.
178. See Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Front, 745 S.E.2d 556, 567 (W. Va.
2013) (“This [integral-ancillary] formulation of the application of section 5 of
the FAA is the majority rule.”).
179. See 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2012).
180. See Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 724 F.3d 787, 791 (7th Cir.
2013) (discussing the court’s skepticism with the way that courts have used
the Integral-Ancillary Test).
181. See Khan v. Dell Inc., 669 F.3d 350, 354–57 (3d Cir. 2012).
182. See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct.
1325, 1330 (2011) (stating that the interpretation of a phrase depends on
“reading the whole statutory text” and “considering the purpose and context of
the statute” before stating that it depends on “consulting any precedents or
authorities that inform the analysis”).
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terpret exclusive arbitration forum clauses and pro-arbitration
policy, indicates that the precedent on exclusive arbitration forum disputes contains deep flaws. As such, practitioners and
courts both need to work to improve the predictability and
functionality of this area of law.
III. BETTER CONTRACTS AND BETTER RULINGS
As the previous discussions demonstrate, there are issues
with how courts reach decisions on exclusive arbitration forum
agreements. This Note proposes a two-part solution. First, Section A discusses how practitioners may be able to fix some of
these problems by drafting exclusive arbitration clauses more
clearly. Better drafting would generally prevent these complicated disputes from arising in the first place. Second, because it
is unlikely that better drafting will solve these issues fully,
courts need to take a more just and consistent approach to interpreting exclusive arbitration forum agreements, as discussed in Section B. Only then will parties have the predictability that they need in this area of contract law.
A. THE ATTORNEYS’ PART: DRAFTING CLEARER EXCLUSIVE
ARBITRATION FORUM CLAUSES
Practitioners can resolve a portion of exclusive arbitration
forum disputes by drafting better exclusive arbitration forum
agreements. This might sound obvious, but it is clear from the
number of exclusive arbitration forum disputes that have arisen since 2009 that many attorneys are drafting poor arbitration
183
clauses. As such, when drafting exclusive arbitration forum
agreements, attorneys can learn a few lessons from the mistakes of their colleagues.
First, attorneys should be explicit in their contracts as to
the parties’ expectations for arbitration. If the parties have only
agreed to arbitration in a single forum, the attorney should
make that clear in the contract. He or she can do so in several
ways. Even though courts have interpreted exclusive arbitra184
tion forum language differently, an attorney stands the best
chance of keeping the language unambiguous if he or she men185
tions the forum repeatedly throughout the contract.
Fur183. See discussion supra Part I.A.
184. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
185. See, e.g., Rivera v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., 2011-NMSC-033, ¶ 38,
150 N.M. 398, 259 P.3d 803 (holding that the pervasive references to the NAF
throughout the contract compelled the conclusion that the parties intended the
NAF to be the exclusive arbitrator); Riley v. Extendicare Health Facilities,
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thermore, the attorney should indicate that the parties wish to
186
use that forum with strong and mandatory language. As to
what constitutes mandatory language, courts have generally
accepted the use of “shall,” i.e., “[the designated forum] shall
187
govern the arbitration.” The attorney should avoid boilerplate
phrases like “under the procedure of” a particular forum, as
188
courts have ambivalently interpreted this language. On the
other hand, if the parties wish to resolve disputes via arbitration regardless of whether a preferred forum is available, the
contract should indicate this. The attorney should make this
clear by emphasizing the parties’ desire to arbitrate generally,
rather than though a particular forum, throughout the agreeInc., 826 N.W.2d 398 (Wis. Ct. App. 2012); see also supra note 91 and accompanying text; cf. Diversicare Leasing Corp. v. Nowlin, No. 11-CV-1037, 2011
WL 5827208, at *6 (W.D. Ark. Nov. 18, 2011) (finding the NAF not integral to
the contract partially because “reference to the NAF was minimal in the Arbitration Agreement”).
186. See Rivera, 2011-NMSC-033, ¶ 31, 150 N.M. 398, 259 P.3d 803 (“Mandatory, as opposed to permissive, contractual language further demonstrates
that a specifically named arbitration provider is integral to the agreement to
arbitrate.”); see also supra note 92 and accompanying text.
187. See Rivera, 2011-NMSC-033, ¶ 31, 150 N.M. 398, 259 P.3d 803 (reviewing caselaw on mandatory language in exclusive arbitration forum disputes and, in doing so, repeatedly indicating that “shall” constitutes mandatory language); see also Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., No. 13-60066-CIV, 2013 WL
1325327, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 1, 2013) (stating that the agreement, which used
“shall” to designate the arbitrator, used mandatory language); Miller v.
GGNSC Atlanta, LLC, 746 S.E.2d 680, 686 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013) (indicating
that the contract’s use of the mandatory words “shall” and “exclusively” to indicate arbitration under the NAF Code of Procedure helped persuade the court
to find that the parties had an exclusive agreement to arbitrate); GenevaRoth, Capital, Inc. v. Edwards, 956 N.E.2d 1195, 1203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)
(discussing how the contract stated that the plaintiff “‘shall’ submit all claims
to the NAF for arbitration” and how that included mandatory language). Of
course, it is possible that language other than “shall” may qualify as mandatory language, such as “will” or “must.” See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471
(1983) (indicating that the statute used “shall,” “will,” and “must,” which the
Court called “language of an unmistakably mandatory character”). However,
these types of phrases have not come up significantly before the courts, and
the caselaw has shown that it can be difficult to predict how a court will interpret the exclusive arbitration forum language of a contract. See, e.g., Meskill v.
GGNSC Stillwater Greeley LLC, 862 F. Supp. 2d 966, 976 (D. Minn. 2012)
(suggesting that the court may have adjudicated the case if the contract had
used “by and under” instead of “in accordance”).
188. See, e.g., Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 768 F.3d 1346, 1350–51 (11th
Cir. 2014) (holding that, in contrast to other cases, the contract before the
court designates a particular forum instead of just the procedure for arbitration); Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 724 F.3d 787, 789 (7th Cir. 2013)
(disagreeing with the district court and finding that “by and under” the NAF’s
Code of Procedure does not constitute an exclusive arbitration forum agreement); see also discussion supra Part II.A.1.
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189

ment.
Second, the contract should provide a contingency should
the parties’ chosen arbitrator become unavailable. If the parties
prefer to litigate in that event, the contract should indicate
this. If the parties would still prefer to arbitrate, the contract
should provide a means for selecting an alternative arbitrator.
Although a court could still appoint a substitute arbitrator for
190
the parties under 9 U.S.C. § 5,
providing an alternative
means in the contract would best serve the parties’ intentions.
Aside from adding clarity to the agreement, drafting a contingency is also important because courts have interpreted the
191
lack of a contingency varyingly.
Third, the attorney should discuss exclusive arbitration forum provisions with his or her clients and ensure that they
participate in making decisions regarding exclusive arbitration
forum agreements. This is especially important if the parties
only wish to resolve disputes in a single arbitral forum and litigate otherwise. Some courts have sent cases to arbitration
simply because the plaintiff produced no evidence that the arbitration forum indicated in the contract was part of his or her
192
decision to accept the terms of the contract.
Finally, the attorney should ensure that he or she is not
specifying a defunct arbitration forum in the exclusive arbitration forum agreement. Although not using a defunct forum may
seem readily apparent, this is a recurring cause of exclusive ar193
bitration forum disputes. Specifically, as discussed earlier, a
189. See, e.g., Wright v. GGNSC Holdings LLC, 2011 SD 95, ¶ 27, 808
N.W.2d 114, 122 (sending the case to arbitration after noting that the contract
made eighteen references to arbitration).
190. See 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2012); see also discussion supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text.
191. Compare Carideo v. Dell, Inc., No. C06-1772JLR, 2009 WL 3485933,
at *4 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 26, 2009) (finding the contract’s lack of provision for an
alternative arbitral forum as support for the NAF being the exclusive forum),
with Adler v. Dell Inc., No. 08-cv-13170, 2009 WL 4580739, at *3 (E.D. Mich.
Dec. 3, 2009) (holding that the contract’s lack of provision for an alternative
arbitral forum only lends ambiguity to the meaning of the arbitration clause).
192. See, e.g., Jones v. GGNSC Pierre LLC, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1168
(D.S.D. 2010) (holding that the plaintiff’s testimony supports a finding that
the forum was not integral because she testified that “she did not negotiate
the Arbitration Agreement, did not remember the Arbitration Agreement itself, but did not doubt that she signed the document”).
193. See, e.g., Green, 724 F.3d at 794 (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that the defendant, in its contract, provided for arbitration by the NAF in
2012 when the NAF closed in 2009); Laboratorios Grossman, S.A. v. Forest
Labs., Inc., 295 N.Y.S.2d 756, 757 (App. Div. 1968) (noting that the parties entered into an agreement for arbitration via a forum that never existed); see al-
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number of cases have arisen because the parties agreed to arbitration by the NAF after it stopped accepting new arbitrations
194
in July 2009. To the mindful attorney, avoiding this problem
comes down to being careful about what boilerplate language is
(and more importantly is not) included in the contract.
Of course, these recommendations assume three things.
First, they assume that the parties are in agreement about arbitration and want to be clear in their contract. Many times,
parties intentionally draft contracts with open or vague
195
terms. They may do so because of uncertainty, risk aversion,
or a desire to avoid worrying about future contingencies, i.e., a
desire to let a court worry about the ambiguity should a prob196
lem arise. If keeping an exclusive arbitration forum clause
vague is in the client’s best interests, then so be it. However, in
that situation, the attorney should discuss with his or her client the pitfalls that may arise should the exclusive arbitration
forum clause come before a court. Specifically, it may be hard to
predict how a judge will interpret the language of a vague ex197
clusive arbitration forum clause.
Second, these recommendations assume that attorneys on
both sides of a contract strive for ethical representation of their
clients. By itself, this assumption is not too disconcerting because there are already checks on an attorney’s ethicality. For
example, if the client’s attorney is doing his job, he should be
able to catch anything the other side has placed in the contract
so supra Part I.A.
194. See, e.g., Green, 724 F.3d at 789; Meskill v. GGNSC Stillwater Greeley
LLC, 862 F. Supp. 2d 966, 968–70 (D. Minn. 2012); Miller v. GGNSC Atlanta,
LLC, 746 S.E.2d 680, 683 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013); see also supra note 38 and accompanying text.
195. See Gregory M. Duhl, Conscious Ambiguity: Slaying Cerberus in the
Interpretation of Contractual Inconsistencies, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 71, 76 (2009)
(“Scholars have previously given attention to the benefits (especially economic)
of lawyers intentionally drafting open, incomplete, and vague contracts . . . .”).
196. See H. Allen Blair, Hard Cases Under the Convention on the International Sale of Goods: A Proposed Taxonomy of Interpretative Challenges, 21
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 269, 303–04 (2011) (“Contract terms may be precise,
vague or anywhere in between. . . . [W]hen parties choose a relatively opentextured standard, they are decreasing their ex ante investment and increasing their expected ex post enforcement costs. Rather than spending time and
money worrying about future contingencies and terms specifying precise obligations in light of those contingencies at the front end of the contracting process, parties are choosing to delegate to a future tribunal the task of specifying
precise obligations.”); Mark P. Gergen, The Use of Open Terms in Contract, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 997, 1006–07 (1992) (discussing how contracts are written
with open terms because of uncertainty, the difficulty of writing and enforcing
certain contracts with specific terms, and risk aversion).
197. See discussion supra Parts I.B, II.A.
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in an attempt to “game” the system.
Nevertheless, this second assumption becomes somewhat
alarming when combined with a third assumption: both parties
are equally represented by counsel. While sophisticated clients
may be equally represented, this is generally not true of parties
198
accepting contracts of adhesion. Such parties often have di199
minished bargaining power as well. Therefore, the drafting
recommendations laid out in this Section are probably of limited utility to individuals who accept a contract of adhesion
with an exclusive arbitration forum clause. For them, help
must come from the courts.
By following these four recommendations gleaned from exclusive arbitration forum dispute caselaw, an attorney can decrease the chances that his or her client’s contract will become
the subject of an exclusive arbitration forum dispute. Unfortunately, for a party accepting a contract of adhesion with an exclusive arbitration forum clause, these recommendations probably hold little value since such a party is not represented by
counsel. Instead, those individuals must rely on the courts to
provide them with an equitable outcome should an exclusive
arbitration forum dispute arise. For this reason, courts must do
a better job of writing decisions that are fair, predictable, and
fully based in the language of 9 U.S.C. § 5.
B. THE COURTS’ PART: WHAT THE COURTS NEED TO DO IN
ORDER TO ENSURE PREDICTABLE AND EQUITABLE RESULTS FOR
PARTIES WITH EXCLUSIVE ARBITRATION FORUM DISPUTES
Resolving an exclusive arbitration forum dispute requires
interpreting the exclusive arbitration clause and applying 9
200
U.S.C. § 5. Accordingly, courts must keep both of these aspects in mind when analyzing and ruling on an exclusive arbitration forum dispute. Along these lines, this Note advances
three simple recommendations to courts hearing these disputes
that will allow for fairer and more consistent rulings. First,
courts deciding exclusive arbitration forum disputes should
start applying a new test that is much more in line with the
language of 9 U.S.C. § 5 than either the Integral-Ancillary or
Exclusivity Test. Second, courts can, and should, use parol evi198. See Schwartz, supra note 130, at 346 (“A ‘contract of adhesion’ in the
parlance of contract law, is a take-it-or-leave-it standard form agreement,
usually presented to a consumer by a business entity.”); see also supra Part
II.A.3.
199. See supra Part II.A.3.
200. See supra notes 44–50 and accompanying text.
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dence when interpreting the contracts of these disputes according to this new test. Finally, courts should start taking consumer protection policies into account when deciding exclusive
arbitration forum disputes, particularly when those disputes
involve contracts of adhesion.
1. Clearer Application of 9 U.S.C. § 5
The way courts currently apply 9 U.S.C. § 5 is convoluted.
Instead of examining the text of the statute directly, courts use
judicially-invented tests that (presumably) attempt to get at
201
the underlying meaning of the statute. However, the disparity in courts’ application of these tests demonstrates that the
202
tests themselves are ambiguous. Instead of using these tests,
a court should simply ask some variation of the following questions:
(1) Did the parties intend to contract for arbitration in
general, and mistakenly agree to a contract that suggests
they only wanted to arbitrate using a particular forum? or
(2) Did the parties intend to contract for arbitration by a
particular forum, and mistakenly agree to a contract that
suggests they wanted to arbitrate in general?
After deciding which of these questions better applies to the
situation, the court should only appoint a new arbitrator if it
finds the parties intended to contract for arbitration in general
and only mistakenly agreed to a contract that suggests they
wanted to arbitrate using a particular forum.
This approach is much more straightforward and in line
with the use of “lapse,” which colloquially means “a small mis203
take,” in the statute. Of course, even if courts adopt this “Intention Test” and apply 9 U.S.C. § 5 by asking these questions,
deciding which question is applicable to the contract before the
court will still require an exercise in contract interpretation,
which is where much of the ambiguity in the exclusive arbitration forum caselaw arises.
2. The Courts Should Give More Credence to Parol Evidence
and Properly Examine the Context of Such Evidence when
201. See supra notes 172–82 and accompanying text.
202. See supra Parts I.B., II.A.1.
203. See supra notes 172–76 and accompanying text.
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Interpreting the Parties’ Contract
Whether a court decides to adopt the Intention Test or follows a different approach, the court must employ principles of
contract interpretation in deciding the parties’ exclusive arbitration forum dispute. Courts may use parol evidence to interpret an ambiguous contract, and in exclusive arbitration forum
disputes, increased use of parol evidence would help courts better interpret parties’ contracts. Indeed, increasing the use of
parol evidence in exclusive arbitration forum disputes would
give courts greater insight into the parties’ intentions when
they entered into the contract and decrease the need for guess204
ing. Moreover, by using more parol evidence, courts would be
able to justify varying interpretations of the same language;
they could point to external evidence demonstrating that the
parties had different intentions when entering into the contracts. Thus, even if courts reached opposite conclusions, other
parties would be left with some guidance as to why the different decisions occurred and thus how a court would rule on their
particular contract.
Moreover, as discussed, it is likely that even courts following the conservative version of the parol evidence rule would be
able to admit such evidence since these contracts’ ambiguity
may potentially be established just by the fact that courts cannot seem to agree on how to interpret the same basic exclusive
205
arbitration forum clauses. One may argue that such a showing itself constitutes external evidence that these strict courts
cannot admit without a showing of ambiguity on the face of the
contract, creating a chicken and egg problem. However, that
argument seems unlikely to prevail. Parol evidence is “prior or
contemporaneous oral agreements, or prior written agreements, whose effect is to add to, vary, modify, or contradict the
terms of a writing which the parties intend to be a final, com206
plete, and exclusive statement of their agreement.” Presenting exclusive arbitration dispute caselaw to a court does not fall
into any of these categories. Moreover, it would be poor policy
for courts to ignore the fact that exclusive arbitration forum
clauses have been interpreted varyingly, as this would perpet204. See Ferdinand S. Tinio, The Parol Evidence Rule and Admissibility of
Extrinsic Evidence To Establish and Clarify Ambiguity in Written Contracts,
40 A.L.R.3D 171, 235 (Supp. 2014) (“Presence of ambiguity in written agreement permits reviewing court to examine extrinsic evidence in effort to clarify
intent of parties.”).
205. See supra notes 124–29 and accompanying text.
206. 11 LORD, supra note 126, at § 33.1.
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uate the problems that exist in the caselaw and that this Note
is trying to address.
Even for those courts currently admitting parol evidence to
interpret these clauses, there is still a problem with how they
have been using it. Courts that have examined parol evidence
when deciding an exclusive arbitration forum dispute have
generally looked at the rules or procedures of the forum indi207
208
cated in the contract, or party testimony and the record.
Courts have relied on forum procedure differently depending on
209
how they have interpreted the procedure’s language. However, as discussed earlier, nearly all courts have ignored the fact
that party testimony or a record showing that the plaintiff(s)
did not consider the indicated arbitration forum as important
when entering into the contract is often in the context of the
210
contract being a take-it-or-leave-it contract of adhesion.
Courts thus need to take this context into account when deciding an exclusive arbitration forum dispute involving a contract
of adhesion.
One may argue that taking this context into account when
reviewing party testimony or the record is unfair to the other
party. This argument is unfounded. First, taking context into
account does not mean that the court should make a presumption in favor of the accepting party to a contract of adhesion. It
207. See, e.g., Klima v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc’y, No.
10-cv-1390-JAR-JPO, 2011 WL 5412216, at *4 (D. Kan. Nov. 8, 2011); Rivera
v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., 2011-NMSC-033, ¶ 35, 150 N.M. 398, 259 P.3d
803; see also supra notes 95–98.
208. See Meskill v. GGNSC Stillwater Greeley LLC, 862 F. Supp. 2d 966,
975 (D. Minn. 2012); Jones v. GGNSC Pierre LLC, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1168
(D.S.D. 2010); Ex parte Warren, 718 So. 2d 45, 49 (Ala. 1998).
209. Compare, e.g., Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 724 F.3d 787,
789–90 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that, even though the NAF Code states that
only the NAF can apply it, any arbitrator could actually use NAF Code and so
the court could appoint a new arbitrator who would use the NAF Code according to the agreement), with Rivera, 2011-NMSC-033, ¶ 35, 150 N.M. 398, 259
P.3d 803 (rejecting this argument).
210. See Selby v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams., No. 12cv01562
AJB(BGS), 2013 WL 1315841, at *11 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2013) (“Plaintiff has
not established, or even argued, that she would not have entered into the underlying Agreement in the event of the NAF’s unavailability to arbitrate the
resulting disputes.”); Meskill, 862 F. Supp. 2d at 975 (“[T]here is nothing in
the record indicating that [the plaintiff] was even aware of the NAF (or its
Code) when he signed the Arbitration Agreement.”); Jones, 684 F. Supp. 2d at
1168 (“[The plaintiff] testified that she did not . . . remember the Arbitration
Agreement itself, but did not doubt that she signed the document . . . .”); Warren, 718 So. 2d at 49 (“There is no evidence that [the plaintiff] or [the defendant] intended their choice of an arbitrator to be an essential term of the contract . . . .”); see also supra Part II.A.2.
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simply means that the court should not assume that the parol
evidence means more than it does. For example, if the court
does take context into account with respect to the plaintiff’s
testimony, the testimony will probably not advance either side’s
arguments. It will only stand for the proposition that the plaintiff did not intend anything with regard to the exclusive arbi211
tration forum clause. But even if taking context into account
means making a presumption against the party that wrote the
contract, doing so would be justified in many cases. Contracts
of adhesion are usually slanted toward the drafting party, as
212
that party had expert advice in preparing the contract. Moreover, the accepting party has no choice but to accept or reject
213
the contract. The drafting party thus has the ability (and in214
centive) to draft terms in his or her favor. As such, a presumption against the drafting party in considering the context
of parol evidence would, at worst, put the parties on equal footing in most exclusive arbitration forum disputes.
As for the mechanics of taking context into account, utiliz215
ing the Intention Test discussed above may inherently help
with this issue. As noted, courts usually employ the IntegralAncillary Test in deciding whether to adjudicate the parties’
216
dispute or send it to arbitration. In the context of this test,
the plaintiff’s testimony or a record stating that the plaintiff
did not consider the arbitration clause seems to go against the
idea that the identity of the forum is integral to the contract.
However, the proposed Intention Test advocates for courts to
make a ruling by looking directly at the parties’ intentions
when they entered into the exclusive arbitration forum agree217
ment. Therefore, by using the questions in the Intention Test,
211. See discussion supra note 210 and accompanying text.
212. Donald P. Harris, Carrying a Good Joke Too Far: TRIPS and Treaties
of Adhesion, 27 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 681, 688 (2006) (“In short, contracts of
adhesion allow one party to impose terms on another unwilling or unsuspecting party. This occurs because the party that drafts the contract usually has
had the advantage of time and expert advice in preparing the contract, almost
inevitably producing a contract slanted in that party’s favor.”).
213. See id. (“Even when the non-drafting party has the opportunity to
read the contract, that party usually lacks any meaningful choice but to accept
the contract—because of a lack of alternatives and because of the accepting
party’s severely disproportionate bargaining position.”).
214. See Jeffrey C. Bright, Unilateral Attorney’s Fee Clauses: A Proposal To
Shift to the Golden Rule, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 85, 91 (2012) (“[T]he stronger party
is able to draft the contract to its advantage without fear of negotiation from
the weaker party.”).
215. See supra Part III.B.1.
216. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
217. See supra Part III.B.1.
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it may become clearer to courts that the party accepting an adhesion contract may not have understood or even considered
the exclusive arbitration forum clause when entering into the
contract.
Overall, courts should more frequently use parol evidence
to ascertain the parties’ intentions in entering into a contract.
Doing so would take much of the conjecture out of interpreting
exclusive arbitration forum clauses. Moreover, courts should be
aware that most of these contracts are contracts of adhesion.
Courts should consider this when evaluating parol evidence, instead of just using it as support for a supposition of general arbitration. However, this second point raises a compelling question: If one of the parties did not have any intention when it
came to the exclusive arbitration forum clause, how should the
court decide?
3. Courts Should Use Consumer Protection Policy To Help
Them Decide Exclusive Arbitration Forum Disputes, Especially
when the Contract Specifies Arbitration by the NAF
Courts are allowed to use policy to help them decide a
218
case. Many courts facing exclusive arbitration forum disputes
already do so by referencing the fact that there is a liberal fed219
eral policy in favor of arbitration. As discussed above, it is
possible that courts may be misapprehending the situation
when they apply this policy to exclusive arbitration forum dis220
putes. However, this is less of a concern than the fact that
this is often the only policy that courts (at least explicitly) ap221
ply. When the contract is a contract of adhesion, this becomes
more problematic because of the power contracts of adhesion
222
give to the drafting party.
Courts should take consumer protection policies into account when dealing with a contract of adhesion including an
218. Cf. Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990) (“In determining the meaning of the statute, we look not only to the particular statutory
language, but to the design of the statute as a whole and to its object and policy.” (emphasis added)).
219. See, e.g., Khan v. Dell Inc., 669 F.3d 350, 356 (3d Cir. 2012); see also
discussion supra notes 157–58 and accompanying text.
220. See supra Part II.B.1.
221. See, e.g., Khan, 669 F.3d 350 (applying only pro-arbitration policy);
Adler v. Dell Inc., No. 08-cv-13170, 2009 WL 4580739 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 3, 2009)
(same).
222. See Schwartz, supra note 130, at 351 (discussing how some scholars
have attacked contracts of adhesion because they allow business interests to
dominate).
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exclusive arbitration forum clause. As examined above, accepting parties may not have even considered the exclusive arbitration forum clause when entering into the contract, which makes
223
finding the intention of the parties difficult. However, the
mere fact that many of these contracts specify arbitration by
the NAF, at times even after the NAF stopped accepting con224
sumer arbitrations,
is disconcerting. It suggests that the
drafting party in these situations may not have had the accepting party’s best interests at heart—just the opposite, as the
225
NAF was shut down for fraudulent bias against consumers.
Indeed, many of these drafting parties may have designated
the NAF because of its bias against consumers. And in the case
of drafting parties that designated the NAF as the exclusive
arbitration forum after July 2009, it makes one wonder whether such drafting parties were being “negligent or deliberately
226
deceptive.”
Yet, many courts do not consider this fact when deciding
an exclusive arbitration forum dispute, even though the majority of these disputes in recent years have gone to court because
227
the NAF stopped accepting arbitrations. This is not fair to the
accepting party. Moreover, it undermines the consumer protection reasons for which the Minnesota Attorney General shut
228
down the NAF. This is not to say that courts should necessarily adjudicate all and any exclusive arbitration forum disputes that involve the NAF. But courts should at least take
note of the reasons why businesses started using the NAF in
the first place and be suspicious of a designation of the NAF as
the exclusive arbitration forum, particularly in a contract of
229
adhesion. The same holds true for any exclusive arbitration
223. See supra notes 150–53 and accompanying text.
224. See, e.g., Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 724 F.3d 787, 789 (7th
Cir. 2013); see also discussion supra notes 38 & 194 and accompanying text.
225. See Firm Agrees To End Role in Arbitrating Card Debt, supra note 8;
see also discussion supra notes 22–28 and accompanying text.
226. Green, 724 F.3d at 794 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
227. For example, in Green, the dissent complained about how the majority
ignored this fact in its decision. Id. The dissent expressed similar sentiments
in Khan v. Dell Inc. 669 F.3d 350, 358–59 (3d Cir. 2012) (Sloviter, J., dissenting) (“The majority avoids any discussion of the underlying reason why arbitration by NAF is unavailable. . . . It cannot be insignificant that Dell named
NAF as the exclusive forum in its arbitration clauses.”).
228. See Berner, supra note 25; see also discussion supra notes 22–28 and
accompanying text.
229. See generally Berner & Grow, supra note 28, at 72–74 (discussing the
unethical practices of the NAF). In Meskill v. GGNSC Stillwater Greeley LLC,
the court did discuss the defendant’s choice of the NAF as the exclusive arbitration forum in the contract of adhesion and why the NAF stopped accepting
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forum clause that specifies a forum that the court notes may be
230
biased in favor of the drafting party.
Altogether, courts can start reaching more predictable and
equitable outcomes for parties with an exclusive arbitration forum dispute by following the recommendations discussed in
this Part. Specifically, courts should look more explicitly at the
parties’ intentions, use more parol evidence, take into account
the context of that evidence, and remember to consult consumer protection policies. When combined with more careful drafting of exclusive arbitration forum clauses, much of the confusion within the field of exclusive arbitration forum disputes can
be avoided in the future.
CONCLUSION
Courts are split on how to decide whether to adjudicate an
exclusive arbitration forum dispute or appoint a new arbitrator
for the parties. Although most use the Integral-Ancillary Test,
courts apply the test differently. Moreover, the test itself may
be misapplying 9 U.S.C. § 5, from which most courts gain the
power to appoint a new arbitrator. Aside from concerns with
the Integral-Ancillary Test, courts have interpreted very similar contractual language creating an exclusive arbitration forum clause in contradictory ways. To overcome these issues,
practitioners must learn from the mistakes of their colleagues
and draft these agreements more carefully. However, since
many of these contracts are contracts of adhesion, this suggestion can only go so far. For the sake of accepting parties to contracts of adhesion, courts should be more consistent and equitable when deciding exclusive arbitration forum disputes.
Courts can achieve this by focusing on the parties’ intentions,
consumer arbitrations. 862 F. Supp. 2d 966, 977 (D. Minn. 2012). The court
even considered the fact that the parties entered into the agreement after July
2009. Id. Nevertheless, the court decided not to hold these facts against the
defendant, reasoning that “[n]othing in the Minnesota Attorney General’s action against the NAF implicated [the defendant].” Id. at 977–78. Although this
author disagrees with some of the court’s conclusions, at least the court in
Meskill fully considered the NAF’s history and decided that it wasn’t relevant
to the case before it. That is more consumer policy consideration than most
courts give to these cases.
230. For example, the arbitration clause in Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc.
specified arbitration by a forum that never conducted arbitrations. 768 F.3d
1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2014). The concurring judge supported the decision because he found the exclusive arbitration forum clause unconscionable “not just
because of unequal bargaining power, but because of [the defendant’s] actions
[the plaintiff] had no ability or opportunity to understand the forum selection
clause.” Id. at 1355 (Restani, J., concurring).
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using more parol evidence and taking into account the context
of such evidence, and remembering to consult consumer protection policies where they apply. By following these recommendations, together courts and attorneys can decrease the number of
exclusive arbitration forum disputes and improve the cohesiveness of this field of law.

